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REMAKING THE CONSTITUTION: A CRITICAL
REEXAMINATION OF THE BOWERS v. HARDWICK

DISSENT
Gerard V. Bradley*

INTRODUCTION

Not only in folklore do historical watersheds spring from trickles. We
all have heard that Mrs. O'Leary's cow kicked over a lamp to start the
Chicago fire, and even sober history texts tell us that one Gavrilo Princip
started World War I. Princip was a politically overactive Serbian nationalist destined to die of tuberculosis in an Austrian prison, but not before
immortalizing himself on June 28, 1914. That day the nineteen- year-old
Princip shot and killed Austrian Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his
wife as they rode in an open car through Sarajevo, Yugoslavia. The occasion, or excuse, for release of smoldering political tensions and blunted
ambitions to remake the world order had arrived. The "war to end all
wars"-The Great War-was on.1
A constitutional Armageddon called Bowers v. Hardwick2 was detonated even more inconspicuously. Playing the role of Princip was twentynine-year-old Atlantan Michael Hardwick. In mid-1982 he was ticketed
for carrying an open bottle of booze. He did not answer the summons,
and a bench warrant was issued. The ticketing police officer went to
Hardwick's home and was let in by an unknown male resident. Where
The man gestured toward a bedroom down a long
was Hardwick?
3
hallway.
The term coitus interruptus was about to acquire new meaning as
causus bellis. Through a partly opened door the officer observed Hardwick and another man fellating, "sodomy" under a Georgia statute4 that
apparently had not been enforced for several decades. 5 H"dwick was ar*

Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. Thanks to Mark Lenczowski,

Class of 1990, for research help on the briefs.
1. W. HARRIS & J. LEVY, THE NEW COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 998, 2219 (1975). See B.
TUCHMAN, THE GUNS OF AUGUST (1962).

2. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
3. Telephone interview with Michael Hobbs, state's attorney (May 22, 1990). Mr.
Hobbs argued the case for Georgia in the Supreme Court. I thank him for his help, especially his best recollection of the events leading up to the arrest of Michael Hardwick. I have
read all the briefs and opinions in the case, as well as the transcript of oral argument, and
have yet to find any account of those events, save for the strong impression that the reason
for the police presence was not to investigate sodomy.
4. The relevant part of the statute is reprinted at 478 U.S. 188 n.1.
5. See 478 U.S. at 198 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring).
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rested on the warrant and charged with sodomy.'
The Fulton County prosecutor declined to proceed to the grand jury,
pending development of "further evidence." Since "further evidence" of
the crime was neither imaginable nor necessary, the matter was closed.
The disposition of the original citation is unknown.
A singular opportunity to reorder society through constitutional lawmaking had arrived, and accumulated tension would not be denied its
release. America's political morality could now be authoritatively settled.
Unlike adultery, incest, prostitution, drug use, abortion, even pornography-all of which present colorable issues of nonconsent or harm to third
parties-rivate homosexual relations between consenting adults perfectly
framed the question of liberal political morality: must the state remain
completely neutral on questions of the human good, and sheath the sword
7
of law until harm to innocent bystanders is demonstrated?
That question has simmered, with occasional boilovers, for over a
generation. When Britain's Wolfendon Commission Report proposed in
1958 to decriminalize homosexual acts, it touched off the single most celebrated legal theoretical debate of the post-war era. The Commission succinctly stated its reason for the recommendation: "It is not the duty of
the law to concern itself with immorality as such."8 Legal enforcement of
morals was reduced to distinguishing immoralities which implicate "public" interests from those which do not. Against laws prohibiting, for example, consensual adult homosexual activities, the Wolfendan
Commission Report urged that "there must remain a realm of private
morality and immorality which is, in brief and crude terms, not the law's
business."
The initial and still best-known counterargument was offered by Patrick Devlin, then a High Court judge. Devlin argued: "It is wrong to talk
of private morality or of the law not being concerned with immorality as
such or to try to set rigid bounds to the part which the law may play in
the suppression of vice .

. .

. [T]here can be no theoretical limits to legis-

lation against immorality."' 0
Devlin, as Robert George so cogently points out,1 does not stand
within the tradition which produces such laws. Devlin's justification for
them is not the tradition's justification. George argues that the tradition
produced several grounds on which morals laws could be justified. These
grounds include a "paternalistic concern for the moral character of per6. Tribe, who argued on behalf of Hardwick before the United States Supreme Court,
describes his client's ignominious treatment during his day in custody following arrest in L,
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1424 n.32 (1988).

7. There are many accounts of liberal political morality by authors like John Rawls,
Ronald Dworkin, Bruce Ackerman, and D.A.J. Richards. For a masterful, sympathetic account, see J. RAZ, THE MoRALrry OF FREEDOM, 110-64 (1986).
8. See R. George, Social Cohesion and the Legal Enforcement of Morals: A Reconsideration of the Hart-Devlin Debate (1990) (unpublished manuscript available from author).
9. Id.
10. P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORcEMENT OF MORALS 14 (1965).
11. See R. George, supra note 8, passim.
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sons who desire to perform immoral acts, and a quasi-paternalistic concern for the moral character of persons whose desires and choices are
likely to be affected by the moral quality of the social milieu which
morals laws may help to maintain."" George notes that virtuous character is a basic aspect of the genuine good of every member of the community, especially those prone to vice. The common interest in achieving and
maintaining such a character can be advanced by common endeavor, including community action to protect the moral integrity of the cultural
milieu in which people form their characters.' 3 For traditionalists, morals
laws encourage individuals to form and help them to maintain a virtuous
character. The contested issue of legal theory is simply put: Does the law
rightly concern itself with the moral perfection of individuals, and act
legitimately for that end, even where there is no "harm" to others or to
society, and where "harm" is not defined without regard to the perfection
of individuals?
This theoretical issue cuts to the heart of a society's self-understanding and influences its entire legal practice. The agitation over gay
rights-one of many areas of law dependent upon resolution of this question-has shown itself able to mobilize great numbers of Americans.
However, debates over legal theory, no matter how interesting, lack a socially authoritative arbiter.
Constitutional debates do not lack an arbiter. With expert legal assistance, Hardwick brought a section 1983 action and transformed the theoretical donnybrook into a constitutional conflagration. There was little
room for genuine neutrality, and some curious alliances were formed.
Joining chief counsel Laurence Tribe as amicis for Hardwick 4 were obvious allies (like the Lesbian Rights Project and the National Gay Rights
Advocates) and some predictable others (like the National Organization
for Women) receiving dividends from the divorce of law from traditional
morality. More unlikely comrades were the American Psychological and
American Public Health Associations and a bevy of religious groups led
by the Presbyterian Church U.S.A. In addition, the American Jewish
Congress joined the argument against the law and its enforcement, as did
(most surprisingly) the Attorneys General of New York and California.
The legal arguments of these groups centered upon the conviction of liberal morality: government should not enforce "private morality." The
lovemaking practices of mature adults were beyond the law's ken because
anyone's views of the action's moral quality, apart from the view of the
participant, is constitutionally forbidden ground for lawmaking.
Briefs in support of the law presented the perfect counterpoint. One
brief linked sodomy prohibition to physical survival in the AIDS era. The
other briefs cleaved to traditional morality and its proper nurturing by
the state. Much of the argument was "pro-family," restating the major
premise: "family" was the institutional form of traditional morality,
12 Id. at n.29 and accompanying text.
13. See id. at nn.48-49.
14. For the line-up of amici, see 478 U.S. at 187 n.*.
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whose relationship to the law was at issue. "Pro-family" signifies the
traditional view that law properly nurtures true principles of morality,
especially concerning sexual relations, and that it wisely discourages, even
to the point of prohibiting, some deviant sexual practice. Hardwick 5 argued for legal tolerance notwithstanding traditional morality, because liberal political morality required it.
Hardwick had his way with the Eleventh Circuit,' but with only a
minority of the Supreme Court.17 Reaction to the decision was commensurate with the stakes. The homosexual community blasted it. "It's a major disaster from our point of view,""' said Thomas Stoddard, executive
director of the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Group, a Hardwick
amicus. The Reverend Jerry Falwell rebutted: "I applaud the decision
... [because] [t]he highest court has recognized the right of a state to
determine its own moral guidelines, and it has issued a clear statement
that perverted moral behavior is not accepted practice in this country."19
20
The disappointed Tribe exhaustively reargued the case in his treatise.
Scholarly commentary has surpassed that for any case since Roe v.
21
Wade.
Bowers v. Hardwick came as advertised: a landmark decision. It decisively stymied not only the movement for federal constitutional protection of gay rights, but probably halted further development of the entire
"privacy" corpus. Cruzan v. Director Missouri Dep't of Health22 is the
most recent example; the expected rollback of Roe the most notorious.
Still the case needs a rationale. I propose one in this article. The truly
unprecedented nature of Hardwick's argument, adopted by four members
of the Court, is a noteworthy event. It is a bombshell, nothing less than a
complete reconstruction of society so that a "new Constitution"-really
liberal political morality-can be sold as the concomitant of a new society. Put differently, I propose to show that the only genuine argument
proposed on behalf of Hardwick's claim-the flagship claim of liberal political morality-is this startling syllogism: if we redefine the nature of
human existence, this is the Constitution that follows.
This article is divided into three parts. Part I will clear away some of
15. I adopt the following artificial but highly useful signals for purpose of this article,

"Hardwick," as in the instant taxt without underscoring, refers, unless otherwise clearly
indicated, to the position urged upon the Supreme Court by Tribe, et al., on behalf of
Michael Hardwick. "Hardwick," with underscoring, refers to the Supreme Court decision

itself.
16. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (11th Cir. 1985), rev'd 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
17. Hardwick was on the losing side of a 5-4 decision.
18. Rother, Friendand Foe See Homosexual Defeat, N.Y. Times, July 1, 1986, at AI9,
col. 1 (quoted in Maroney, Bowers v. Hardwick: A Case Study in Federalism, Legal Procedure, and ConstitutionalInterpretation,38 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1223, 1236 (1987)).
19. Id.
20. See L. TRIBE, supra note 6, at 1421-35.
21. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). That is the conclusion of my most unscientific survey. For a
very good symposium discussion of the case, see Selnick, Dworkin's Unfinished Task, 7
CALIF. L. REV. 475-594 (1989).
22. 110 S. Ct. 360 (1989).
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the rhetorical clutter in the opinions and briefs to expose the decisive
issue in the case: liberal political morality and its constitutional enforcement. Part II sketches in summary form why the Constitution is demonstrably agnostic on that question: The Constitution neither requires nor
prohibits enforcement of traditional morality, or of liberal political morality. Part III details the revolution effected by those who would constitutionalize liberal political morality.
The analysis here relies upon Blackmun's dissent (joined by Stevens,
Brennan, and Marshall) and Tribe's brief, oral argument, and reargument
in American Constitutional Law. These sources reflect the legal arguments of the other briefs and most commentators, and include sufficient
reference to other authorities to warrant treating them as the prototypical
argument.
PART I

Hardwick is a depressing scene from the Constitution After Babel.
This cacophony owes nothing to divine intervention. In so characterizing
the various opinions I relate the lamentations of the Justices themselves.
They are not just chagrined but amazed at their colleagues' views. Surely,
it signals analytical desperation when a majority derides the central dissent argument as "facetious. ' 23 Worse, the dissent dispatched that comic
note as an imbecilic observation about an irrelevant issue. 4 The opinions
of White and Blackmun contain even more than the usual ration of flip
remarks, advocacy history, revisionus decisis, and intellectual ecumenism
relaxed among discordant, even contradictory premises, sometimes in the
same paragraph.
Tribe evinced a particularly brazen indifference to contradiction, one
that surprised even the justices. He steadfastly maintained that he
facially attacked the statute in order to prevent focus upon "gay" sex.
Yet, Tribe consistently argued that the real issue was privacy of the
home. Hardwick was arrested at home, but the statute cares nothing for
the location of the prohibited acts. The following exchange then took
place:
Question: "Well, then it is really not a facial attack on the statute I
don't think."
Mr. Tribe: "If you want to call it something else that is not a
problem."25
The Court, not unwittingly, reached the right result in Hardwick.
Through all the turgid, disingenuous advocacy and opining, the central
question was recognized, articulated, and determined. However, Tribe is
almost right about one thing. When "spin controlling" the case in Ameri23. 478 U.S. at 194.
24. See 478 U.S. at 202 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
25. Transcript of Oral Argument at 32 (University Publications of America) (available
from author) [hereinafter Transcript].
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can Constitutional Law, he brands it an unprincipled holding. 26 More
precisely, both the question and the rationale for the Court's answer are
covered over with the weeds of good advocacy, among other things.
Effective appellate advocacy presses for "fit" with extant law by manipulation of reinforcing contrary pressures. It narrows (as much as reasonable, and perhaps then some) the question presented, then expands
(as much as reasonable, and perhaps then some) the reach of prior cases
to meet the instant one. In reconstructing the "mere facts" of past cases,
the articulated holding and rationale can all be discarded in favor of the
broad principle implicit in the decision. This is Tribe's jargon, what the
Court must have meant, in spite of what it said. Ingestion of the instant
case then hardly causes a burp.
However, today's decision is tomorrow's precedent. Its implicit principle will lead the next charge. Simply and provocatively put: The object
in Hardwick was a result which inescapably presumed the constitutionalization of liberal political morality, without the Court (or at least some
members) knowing it. That may be good advocacy but it is a poor way to
make law. This part explores the selling of Hardwick's claim. Its primary
purpose is not to prove that the Court was (or was not) duped, but to
convince the reader that this was indeed a referendum on the constitutional enforcement of liberal political morality.
Blackmun deploys a belligerent Holmesianism to do the dirtiest obfuscatory work.
[I]t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that it
was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the
rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.2 7
A greater critical distance from the issue, not to mention any sense of
irony, would have prompted parenthetical note of the remarkable majoritarianism in which Holmes' skepticism culminated. Holmes could not rationally account for a person's basic convictions-they were just "can't
helps," as in "I can't help (but don't know why and certainly cannot provide compelling reasons why I) believe such and such." There was little
else to justified lawmaking than that enough folks happen to have the
same "can't helps." Holmes' Lochner v. New York dissent earns him
praise for its support of progressive labor laws. But its rationale was that
a majority can, will, and all but should embody their opinions in the law,
notwithstanding the Millsian "shibboleth" (which Holmes himself probably shared) that the citizen is at liberty "to do as he likes so long as he
does not interfere with the liberty of others to do the same."2 8 Nor was
the "individual" and his dignity a resolute farrier against this patent majoritarianism. Forced sterilization, Holmes wrote, is justified by society's
26. See L. TRINE, supra note 6, at 1422-23, 1429-30.
27. 478 U.S. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
28. See 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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impatience: "Three generations of imbeciles are enough."29
Whether or not Holmes is dubious authority, his redirected sarcasm
surely misses the mark. The point of the majority opinion and of the respondents' briefs in Hardwick is not that the Georgia law is justified by
or the product of some automatic process, as if somnambulant legislators
rubberstamped a dusty ancient scroll. That is Blackmun's and Holmes'
caricature. The Georgia legislature, presumably awake and attentive, enacted the statute in 1968 as a conscious response to judicial decisions limiting the predecessor proscription to misplaced penises: neither lesbian
activity nor cunnilingus were "sodomy" as then defined.30 In fact, Blackmun presupposes contemporary "majority disapproval" in his main argument, which is all about the relationship between moral consensus,
majoritarian political processes, constitutional lawmaking by the judiciary, and individual autonomy. Tribe made much of the state's "tautologi31
cal" justification: the majority passed the law because it so desired.
What follows from this is anyone's guess. Is it better that "majorities"
pass laws they don't want?
I shall shortly revisit Tribe's argument and the various rhetorical assignments given the term "majority."3 2 If the Holmesianism misfires,
what is the point of White's extensive reference to the long history of
sodomy's legal condemnation? There are actually two points, neither resembling Blackmun's strawman. The first rebuts the central dissent argument that there is a "fundamental right" to engage in Hardwick's
preferred sexual practice. Any account of our cultural, legal, and constitutional traditions negates such a claim, and the evidence adduced is, indeed, historical. That corresponds to the featured test of such claims. It
inspects the "traditions and collective consciences" of our people. That
inspection reveals a nightmare of conventional morality, more or less
what one would expect from a society determined by Christian moral
principles. The Holmesianism then is quite inapposite. According to this
account, even the repudiation of conventional morality by wide-awake
contemporary legislatures-the antithesis of his caricature-would not alter the verdict of tradition.
It may seem that an important preliminary skirmish has been predetermined here: the subject of this historical investigation. If "X" (some
activity) is a "fundamental right" only if verified as such by "the traditions and collective conscience of the people," what is "X"? Is it fellatio,
fellatio in the dark, or same-sex fellatio? Is "X" "intimate association" or,
most commodiously, a "right to be let alone"? This call can well be decisive and subject to honest difference of opinion. But the cause is not
hopeless. Such unbounded propositions as a "right to be let alone" may
serve well as rhetorical tropes where debating points are prized or in writ29. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
30. For a discussion of Georgia's definition of "sodomy," see 478 U.S. at 200 n.1
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
31. Transcript, supra note 25, at 27.
32. For a discussion of Tribe's argument, see infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
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ing a Greta Garbo biography. But they are analytically useless. We might
as well simply give over to the courts the entire problem of government as
to charge them with conclusively detailing the specifications of an indeterminacy like the "right to be let alone." The only response to such a
proclamation can be, well, what do you mean by a "right to be let alone"?
It is clear that in Hardwick something quite specific is intended.
The problem of further limning "X" is not "indeterminate," as in
susceptible of multiple, equally plausible renderings. Meaning, here as
elsewhere, comes from context. Our context includes the "tradition" to
which authoritative appeal is made, and the reasons the "tradition" is
authoritative. It is the appellate authority because of the universal conviction of Supreme Court Justices, past and present, that constitutional
lawmaking by the judiciary is not the same thing as discerning the best or
truest political morality. This is no positivism, but a theoretically dictated allowance that any political theory requires, in addition to a political morality, an account of institutional authority which will necessarily
parcel out authority to realize the true political morality. We usually call
this parceling a matter of jurisdiction-power to act.
For example, only with great difficulty and much unhappy experience
have political liberals succeeded in redefining police conduct as the antithesis of a street-corner sheriff dispensing "justice," as if he were a despot seated under a palm tree. Now these government officers are
beseeched to simply follow the established rules. After much unhappy experience with Richard Nixon, in both domestic and foreign policy, political liberals also convinced us that presidents, like cops, ought not "just do
the right thing" regardless of the rules laid down. These concerns imply
not that institutional authority determines political morality, but that institutional authority determines competence to pursue authoritatively political morality. No doubt liberalism would have courts control all
authoritative expression of political morality. That is a claim not about
political morality, but institutional authority, which is to say, at least in
our society, a claim about constitutional law. It is true that liberalism
smuggles in an institutional prescriptive along with its political morality,
that the latter implicitly determines the former. That illicit scheme is exposed below.
Again consider Holmes, tradition, and judicial identification of fundamental rights. Any appeal to tradition is belied whenever the issue is
effectively resolved before the "authority" is allowed to give evidence. I
suggest that "tradition" not only can but must decisively shape the initial
characterization. 33 If so, one will look in vain through the history of our
legal order-constitution, statute, common law, state, and federal-for a
right to "intimate association" or any cognate term. That is because what
we know pre-analytically to be true is in fact true: that this type of "functional" conception of individual "relationships" is contemporary. Our
33. See the fascinating, contentious exchange between Justice Scalia (who defends a
view much like that in the text) and Justice Brennan (who does not) in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989).
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predecessors, for better or worse, thought in terms of concrete institutions

(like marriage and family) and specific acts (heterosexual genital intercourse) whose form and substance were determined by the traditional
morality which the transposition into psychological terms is meant to
evade. Let us not pretend that centuries of culture and law can be effaced
by word play.
I am now ready to identify the second main purpose of the historical
material. It demonstrates not Holmes' unthinking ancestor worship, but
that something called "public morality" has always been a legitimate aspect of state police power. Until quite recently no one doubted the comportment of state police power with the federal Constitution. Even in
Griswold v. Connecticut,3 which is touted as precedent for Hardwick,
Justice Harlan scotched the argument that banning contraceptives was an
"irrational," "moral" judgment, and therefore the couple was subject to
the "arbitrary whim" of the legislature for "no good purpose." Justice
Harlan stated:
Yet the very inclusion of the category of morality among state concerns
indicates that society is not limited in its objects only to the physical
well-being of the community, but has traditionally concerned itself with
the moral soundness of its people as well. Indeed to attempt a line between public behavior and that which is purely consensual or solitary
would be to withdraw from community concern a range of subjects with
which every society in civilized times has found it necessary to deal."

The impeccable historical credentials of anti-sodomy laws both rebut
the fundamental rights claim and make the case for "public morality" in
the traditional sense. Fundamental rights and public morality are almost,
but not quite, opposite sides of the same coin. If one has a "fundamental
right" to do "X," that does not mean that "X" is free of all legal regulation. All manner of "free speech," for instance, may be regulated quite
extensively. What is "free" about speech is not graspable in any material
sense, but in the formal sense that regulation must be "content neutral,"
i.e., government must remain indifferent to what you say, though not to
how you say it. Hardwick would admit that if a legitimate state purpose,
say public health, really required intrusion upon intimate association, his
"right" would be subordinated. What he insists upon is that no regulation
in the interest of his own moral welfare-as defined by a "majority"-may be sustained. Thus, fundamental rights have a negative impact. They remove the "prejudice" against the acts that are protected
from the legitimate governmental purposes.
Abortion has tested this thesis. Does the Roe right require government to treat childbirth and abortion as equally legitimate alternatives so
that one may not be encouraged over the other? A majority of the Su34. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
35. Id. at 500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,
545-46 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
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preme Court in Maher v. Roe s said not. Childbirth may be encouraged,
but Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun-all dissenters in Hardwick-held
otherwise. Tribe was asked if Hardwick's claim implied that the state
may not encourage heterosexual marriage. He stammered.3 7 This had
been the precise ground in the decision in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney,38 summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court.3 9 Claiming that marriage stood on an equal footing with Hardwick's liaison was not going to
attract swing votes. I submit that the deeper logic of liberal political morality hankers after a "marketplace of lifestyles" in which a night watchman state stands by to prevent force and fraud in transactions among
mature citizens, to maintain sanitary conditions, and to provide legal
forms for Whatever arrangements ensue. Heterosexual monogamy would
be just one option among many others.
At times Tribe so refracted this central message that his reasoning
became almost opaque. He opened oral argument with the simple statement that the case was all about "the limits of governmental power. ' 40
He nevertheless stressed a much more modest claim stemming from his
asserted "tautology:" Before government may exercise its power over
Hardwick's sexual act of choice, it must give a reason. 41 That is not about
limits on governmental power but a prerequisite to the exercise of any
and all governmental power, even under a rational basis test. Tribe's formulation is disingenuous. First, if he really wanted a "reason" for the
laws he would write a Georgia legislator who voted for the bill and ask
why. He might read the legislative history or a newspaper account of the
law's enactment. Second, Tribe is not just asking for a "reason," for he
knows that Georgia's attorneys have several of them, including the maintenance of a decent and "moral society." Actually, Tribe is seeking judicial evaluation of the reasons given by Georgia's legal representatives.
Third, he is asking for a particular type of evaluation: "heightened scru' He allows
tiny."42
that under a rational basis test, the Court might well
sustain the law as protective of marriage, itself the ground for decision in
Griswold. Fourth, and most fundamentally, Tribe must eliminate that
reason which would sustain the law under heightened scrutiny: his "tautology," which is really that Georgia deems sodomy immoral, bad for
those who do it, and destructive of that virtue which the law rightly inculcates. Now we are back to the preceding section's two-front assault.
For as yet unarticulated reasons, judgment of immorality may not underwrite law. We need to know why not.
Getting to those reasons requires real detective work, for the landscape is scattered with beached herrings, all of them red, all contributing
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

432 U.S. 464 (1977).
See Transcript, supra note 25, at 26-28.
403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975).
425 U.S. 901 (1976).
Transcript, supra note 25, at 17.
Id. at 20, 25-26.
Id. at 25.
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to the rhetorical cause by airbrushing over the fundamental reordering at
issue. A common refrain: the law cannot, or should not, enforce morality.
But, as Justice White said, the law is constantly based upon moral
choices. 4 3 The amici briefs actually speak of "private morality" and its
immunity from state interference. It may be that in the order imagined
by Hardwick "morality" is reduced to purely personal affairs, almost entirely those relating to sexual relationships and activities. In that scenario, public life would still operate according to norms, but the norms
would evidently be derived entirely from premises by a method not fairly
called "moral." Thus "morality" would join "religion" in a private sphere
populated by "value judgments." This conception resembles one standard
account of law and morals, usually denoted "liberal," in which public life
is carried on according to rules the reasons for which are accessible to
each and every person, at least to those with the proper formation. To
most people today that rules out "religion," which is not only controversial but assertedly non-rational. For skeptics like Holmes, it rules out morality, too.
Hardwick proposes to settle definitively the relationship between law
and morality. But we already have had to provide a specialized definition
of "morality," one hardly self-evident and which actually is rooted in liberalism itself."4 Introduction of the similar-sounding but analytically un-

related concept of public decency further muddies the waters. There is no
necessary connection between acts condemned as offenses to public decency and "immorality," even where each is a creature of majority convictions. Many morally neutral acts, like defecating and disrobing, are
generally prohibited in public. Some moral duties, like marital lovemaking, are relegated to "private" settings and would offend public decency
were they performed elsewhere.
Tribe readily admitted the legitimacy of rules governing public decorum, even if they were rooted entirely in majority sensibilities.4" This confuses Tribe's argument. How would an ordinance banning homosexual
kissing in public or, more likely, a pattern of enforcing a generic ban on
public displays of affection which amounted to the same thing be consistent with the contempt deployed for majority sensibilities? Blackmun
says "mere knowledge," apparently as opposed to actual observation, that
immoral acts are taking place is no reason for law. 4" But this construction
hides implicit reliance upon liberal privacy precepts. The acts may be private, but the institutions and laws governing them are not.4 7 In any event,
personal integrity is equally at stake, in or out of doors.
Meticulous work is necessary to dissolve the most emphasized
smokescreen. The argument goes like this. There is heightened constitu43. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
44. I refer to the concept of "private morality."
45. See Transcript, supra note 25, at 42.

46. 478 U.S. at 213.
47. See the penetrating discussion in Selznick, Dworkin's Unfinished Task, 77 CALIF.
L. REV. 505-13 (1989).
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tional protection for Hardwick's behavior because it stands at the confluence of two powerful currents of constitutional privacy: that surrounding
"intimate association," and that patrolling the doorstep of the "home."
We have heard much about the former. Of the latter, Tribe noted in oral
argument, "a private home ... represents the repository of constitutional
traditions under the third and fourth amendments."' 8 Neither tradition
can bear the entire justifactory load. Hardwick conceded that not all intimate sexual relations in a home are privileged, as the examples of adultery and incest make clear.4 But the sum is a single constitutional right,
the argument being that any deficiency in the "privacy" of intimate association is remedied by the addition of whatever "privacy" inheres in the
"home is a man's castle" tradition. Put differently, even if there is no
fourth amendment violation-and there was not in this case-that provision can jump start a faltering claim to free sexual expression, a claim not
quite within the pantheon of constitutional rights. The arithmetic goes
something- like this: First amendment satisfied plus fourth amendment
satisfied equals Constitution unsatisfied. You cannot add apples and oranges and get more apples than you started with, even in constitutional
law. Are such incommensurables being computed? At first glance they are
not, but indeed they are. The problem of "incommensurability" may
seemingly be overcome along the lines of Harlan's analysis in Griswold.
We might conclude that no constitutional protection attaches to sodomy.
It therefore may be criminalized. But other matters which do enjoy a
kind of constitutional protection and which almost always occur in the
home-marital lovemaking, family intimacy-would be damaged by the
usual means of enforcing laws against the prohibited conduct. Were the
pun not so pathetic, Harlan might have concluded not that contraceptive
use was a constitutional right, but a prophylactic safeguard of something
that was-marital lovemaking. Just as the miranda warnings are a fence
around the "core" guarantee against involuntary confession, the term
"right"--as in "read him his rights"-is a common parlance hiding an
important difference.
I am sure that calculation is more a legislative than a judicial operation. However, Hardwick does not avail himself of the argument, nor
could he. It is worth highlighting something you would never learn from
his entire argument, despite its extraordinary discourses on the "home:"
The breach here had nothing to do with criminal investigation of any
kind, much less for sodomy. That is, Harlan's calculation presupposes
that which cannot be presupposed here: Criminalized "sodomy" will
prompt more police penetration of the home than otherwise. That will
not be the case.
In addition, Hardwick does not want to grant the premise that sodomy is no subject of constitutional solicitude. That is his objective. The
"home" security argument serves the premise, not the other way around.
48.
49.

Transcript, supra note 25, at 19.
See id. at 18-24.
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There is no way of avoiding the constitutional status of Hardwick's conduct. True, Tribe wants to track Griswold by pressing his "facial" attack:
"[T]he power invoked here," he says, is "to dictate in the most intimate
and... embarrassing detail how every adult, married or unmarried, in
every bedroom in Georgia will behave. . . ."5 But this "facial attack" is
nonsense: The statute on its face says nothing about "place" at all, as
Tribe's later concession confirms. The move introduces yet another incommensurability: public decorum. Tribe implicitly suggests that Georgia's law serves no interest in protecting third-party sensibilities, as
public decency laws do. Maybe so, but the sodomy law is not a public
decency law. It serves an entirely separate purpose. Tribe's argument
then reduces to the conduct involved, and whether its immorality may
occasion corrective lawmaking.
The fourth amendment discussion is purely diversionary. As Justice
Stewart said in Katz v. United States,5 1 the fourth amendment protects
persons, not places,5 2 not even the home. Only the legitimate expectations
of privacy persons possess in the home, and not the physical plant, is the
Constitution's care. While a warrant is ordinarily required to cross its
threshold, the home is, as a matter of fourteenth amendment law, transparent for conduct within. Put differently, wherever the fourth amendment permits home entry, it is presumed that "intimate association" is
disrupted. Sex, including fellatio, is a specification of that generic "privacy" which the fourth amendment protects. For fourth amendment purposes then, Hardwick wins his argument: his actions at home, whatever
they may be, are constitutionally protected to the extent of imposing constraints upon police entry. Had Hardwick been playing Scrabble with his
friend or even if he was building a nuclear bomb, the fourth amendment
would still impose the same requisites to police entry and they would still
be met. The "home" booster is doubly inapposite: Fourth amendment law
implies nothing about morals legislation, and it implies even less about
distinguishing particular intimate activities (e.g., sodomy) for constitutional super-protection.
Apart from Harlan's Griswold argument, 53 there really is nothing else
the "home" analytically contributes, save its misuse in the misunderstood
Stanley v. Georgia case. 54 Hardwick makes much of this misuse, as well
he should. Stanley is indistinguishable from this case, but it had nothing
to do with the fourth amendment. The similarities between the two cases
are uncanny.5 5 In Stanley, Georgia also prosecuted Mr. Stanley for sexual
indulgence in his home. Police officers acting within the fourth amend50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Id. at 351.
For a discussion of the Griswold argument, see supra note 34 and accompanying

text.
54. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). The entire Hardwick Court misunderstood Stanley.
55. The account in the text is drawn entirely from the Supreme Court opinion in
Stanley. Specific cites are for quotations only.
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ment, but for reasons unrelated to the "sexual" offense for which Stanley
was arrested, found dirty movies in Stanley's bedroom. He was arrested
under a statute which prohibited possession of "obscene" materials. This
statute did not, as the one in Hardwick did not, attend to any particular
place. Therefore, the statute was not a public decency law. Obviously, the
same concern for the moral well-being of Georgians explained both laws.
Prior to Stanley there had been a category of printed and other
materials entirely outside the protections of the first amendment. In common legal parlance, "obscene" materials enjoyed no constitutional protection; their regulation presented no constitutional question. The cases
have been all about defining "obscenity," and thus distinguishing it from
the protected class of materials. The parties to Stanley stipulated, and
the Court assumed, that the movies were "obscene" as the term was then
defined. The case made no effort to redefine "obscenity." Yet Stanley's
prosecution was invalidated due to some constitutional right relating to
"obscene" materials. This much suggests that the "right" was not a first
amendment right, at least as previously defined. One might therefore conclude, as did the Hardwick majority, that Stanley "protect[ed] conduct
that would not have been protected outside the home ..
."" This argument resembles Tribe's fourth amendment jump starter. Accordingly,
Hardwick might argue that his conduct, while prohibited outside the
home, was constitutionally protected inside.
Stanley cannot be distinguished as a first amendment case. It will
not do to say, as does Justice White, that "[t]he right pressed upon us
here has no similar support in the text of the Constitution, and it does
not qualify for recognition under the prevailing principles of construing
the fourteenth amendment."57 The first amendment text says nothing
about possession of obscene materials and the fourteenth amendment's
interpretation is the subject of the instant debate. In a system of "free
expression," which is precisely what the Court has construed the first
amendment to construct, there is no categorical distinction between
watching obscene movies or doing "obscene" things, if done in "private."
That is Hardwick's point, and a good one. Once the text is effaced to
make way for a "system" of "free expression," the law obviously is determined by some encompassing philosophical principle which is not limited
to a particular text, but which will guide interpretation of many. The reasons which explain Stanley's interpretation of the first amendment warrant a favorable rule for Hardwick, regardless of which particular
constitutional provision is invoked. Hardwick is right: Stanley presents
the same issue as Hardwick.
Take a closer look then at Stanley, particularly its reasoning. The
uncanny resemblances here to Hardwick's argument are deeper than even
he or his lawyers imagined. One can imaginatively reconstruct the cases
so that they are factually identical, and change no fact of analytical sig56. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 195.
57. Id.
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nificance. Make Stanley invite over a friend to watch an "obscene" movie,
or have Hardwick watch such a movie alone. As Georgia's attorney clearly
saw, the common issue is whether sexual faculties are tools for simple
self-gratification.
Conclusion: per Stanley, the conduct "cannot constitutionally be
made a crime."58 Why not? Stanley "is asserting the right to read or observe what he pleases-the right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional
needs in the privacy of his own home."5 9 This "traditional notion of individual liberty"' 0 is embedded in the philosophy of the first amendment:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance
of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew
that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be
found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their
beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone-the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized man."'
Against this juggernaut, a mere centuries old constitutional category like
"obscene" dissolves. It is true, Justice Marshall admitted, "that Roth [.v
United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)] does declare, seemingly without qualification, that obscenity is not protected by the first amendment." 2 But
no case, including Roth, has dealt with "mere private possession. ' 63 Stan'
ley is not, Marshall now says, "decided simply by citing to Roth. "4
If Roth only "seemingly" declared obscenity outside the first amendment, what did it really declare? In what I submit is the first shot in a
genuine constitutional revolution by enthusiasts of liberal political morality (not Griswold, which is distinguishable, and not the later Roe), Marshall asserted that Roth and subsequent cases actually stand for the
individual autonomy suggested by the "right to be let alone," save for
regulation justified by "important interests." What are those interests?
"Georgia asserts the right to protect the individual's mind from the effects of obscenity.""" Marshall well understood this argument, even as he
scoffed at it. He realized it was the traditional commitment to nurturing
the moral well-being of individual citizens. "To some, this may be a noble
purpose, but it is wholly inconsistent with the philosophy of the first
amendment." 6 The Bastille has just fallen.
Stanley is all about limits on governmental power. Legitimate gov58. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 559.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 565.
61. Id. at 564 (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
62. Id. at 560.
63. Id. at 561.
64. Id. at 563.
65. Id. at 565.
66. Id. at 565-66.
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ernmental interests reduce protection of harm to third parties. Georgia
asserted that exposure to obscene materials may lead to deviant sexual
behavior or crimes of sexual violence. Marshall's response: There is little
empirical evidence for that assertion. Roth had rejected the idea that a
connection with anti-social conduct need be shown. But Roth, which
dealth with public distribution, inhabited the ancient regime. In the new
world of Stanley, regulation of public distribution is appropriate not because persons should not have it-they should, if they want-but solely
because children might get them, or they "might intrude upon the sensi'
bilities or privacy of the general public."68
The reader has no doubt detected the profound pre-analytical commitment to autonomy propelling Stanley. The "home" setting was accidental. Clearly, any place shielded from uninvited view is all the premises
require. Once that is appreciated, "home" is an indicator, almost an irrebuttable one, that what takes place there is privileged because the legitimate government interests are not implicated. "Home" will then be a
legal term of art carrying out that sorting function. But it would be analytically transparent if the interests Harlan championed, without announced dissent, just six years earlier in Griswold, were still legitimate
ones.
A final troubled concept needs analysis for its precise meaning and
role in Hardwick's convoluted argument. That concept is "majority," as
in (for examples) a "majority" cannot impose its "morality" on minorities
or dissenting individuals and "moral sentiments" cannot legitimate law.
"Majoritarianism" figures prominently in most constitutional theory
these days, ranging from the speculation of a professed liberal like Ronald
Dworkin, who would identify majoritarianism with collective interests
and legislation and rights with judicial protection of the individual,6" to
the "conservative" Robert Bork, who considers it the central dilemma of
constitutional law.70 In the middle might be John Ely,7 1 and other "process" models grounded in the famous Caroline Products footnote. These
models all harbor the same central conviction: Majorities in our democracy are the ordinary guardians of public life but they are the problem of
constitutional law. The endangered species of constitutional law is "minority," or, in Bork's recent book, the apparently fungible term "individual.17 2 The predatory beast is some kind of "majority." Part II argues

that this entire construction is the constitutionalism of the recent past,
that the Constitution and the tradition of its interpretation are fundamentally misrepresented by this construction.
There is more to say about this overburdened but rarely explicated
concept. First, "majoritarianism" is an inherently unstable notion.
67. Id. at 566.
68. Id. at 567.
69. See R. DWORKIN,
70.

71.
72.

TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY

(1977).

See R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 139-41 (1990).
J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
See R. BORK, supra note 70.
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G.E.M. Anscombe has shown how a majority can be in the minority on a
majority of occasions. 73 On any particular occasion, an enacted law may
actually express the will of a minority. Some laws pass by overwhelming
majorities, near unanimity. Even then, various considerations of party
loyalty, logrolling, and perhaps legislator indifference condition any attempt to extract from the legislative process some moral verdict upon the
matter at issue.
As an empirical fact, majoritarianism is fairly unremarkable. To
make decisions, there is either unanimity or something else. That something else, in most settings affecting common life, ought to be a majority.
Obviously, "majorities" of judges determine constitutional issues, so that
it is neither consensus nor unanimity that is decisive; rather, redefinition
of the relevant pool of decisionmakers. Indeed, sometimes minorities of
judges do. Even in Hardwick, if one totals up the positions of each federal
judge ruling on the case, from district through appellate to Supreme
Court, it comes out dead even.7 ' Second, majorities remain the ordinary
channel of political decisionmaking, so that one needs critical additional
premises, like the constitutional text, to identify that which is problematic and that which is not about majority outcomes. Third, we still agree
that a "super-majority" can, by amending the Constitution, work its will
upon minorities, and that courts would uphold the constitutionality of an
explicit constitutional norm. Fourth, according to the featured methodology of both sides in Hardwick, a "majority" or consensus of the
dead-"tradition"-gets to identify the constitutional rights which judges
are supposed to protect against living majorities.
What is this chameleon's job in Hardwick? "Majoritarianism" functions to define a problem and to weight it toward a particular resolution,
rather than to describe any empirical reality. It traffics in a submerged
but still influential construct, in which "majority v. minority" indicates a
"lack of consensus," which through appeal to still further submerged
premises, yields a conclusion that individuals should therefore be free to
choose the view that they like free of "imposed" morality. Abortion regulation is a good example of this sequence at work. The law professors'
"pro-choice" brief in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services states:
The root idea of limited, constitutional government is that such essentially contested, divisive, and speculative matters as the moral or metaphysical status of fetuses from the moment of conception are not to be
mandatorily resolved for us all, at the cost of fundamental liberties of
personal self-direction, by "accommodation" among any number of
"factions" in a "political process." 5
73.

G. ANSCOMBE,

JORITY'S WILL, in

3

ON FRUSTRATION OF THE MAJORITY BY THE FULFILLMENT OF THE MA-

THE COLLECTED PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS OF G.E.M. ANSCOMBE

123-30

(1981).
74., The Supreme Court ruled 5-4, and the single district court judge ruled in Georgia's
favor. The Eleventh Circuit was split 2 1/2to /2 for Hardwick, for a standoff of 6 2 - 6 /2.
The "half" represents the partial concurrence and partial dissent of Circuit Judge Kravitch.
75. Law professors' brief for respondent at 31, Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs.
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"Majoritarian"-centered constitutional law actually cut both ways in
Hardwick. Hardwick, or likely his legal advisors, recruited a married
couple desirous of performing prohibited acts to join the attack. The district court dismissed their complaint for lack of standing. They did not
allege that they were threatened with prosecution or that other couples
had been so threatened.7 6 Had the married couple remained, Hardwick's

case might have "piggy-backed" upon a marital privacy argument. But it
might have been diminished as well. Note the double-edged nature of the
majoritarian pivot. Ely's process version would validate this law since its
affected class was no "minority" of homosexuals but a much broader
range of persons, including married heterosexuals. It is hard to believe
that a majority of Georgians wanted to criminalize such a range of actions. As it was, the state helped frame the majority/minority conflict by
expressly conceding that the statute could not be constitutionally enforced against a married couple. 7 Tribe argued that there was no "consensus" against even the conduct proscribed by the statute, and religious
amici seconded that observation. In this view, Hardwick profited by dismissal of the joined plaintiffs, and by the state's limitation of the statute
to unmarried persons. But is there a consensus, or a majority, in favor of
enforcement?
These comments warrant at least the provisional conclusion that
"majoritarianism" is not an analytical construct, but an attractive rhetorical flag for an analysis yet to be brought into view, an analysis rooted in
additional unrelated premises replete with a "sociology" which in turn
controls the choice of banners. That construct is elaborated in Part III.
A final postscript on the incense that wafts so pungently through
Blackmun's analysis is necessary. Blackmun is very concerned with attributing the anti-sodomy law to "religious intolerance,"78 which he considers akin to a four-letter word. Blackmun may even presume that
nothing more needs to be said to conclude that the law is unconstitutional. At most, though, Blackmun truly relates a modest empirical observation: Some persons in favor of the law condemn sodomy due to
religious precepts.
On the basis of the briefs submitted, it actually seems that believers
more often opposed the law. Lots of believers doubtlessly have no view on
the subject; others may think sodomy wrong, but enjoy it anyway. Still
more may think it wrong but no subject for legal regulation. It is certainly
untrue that one must be "religious" to think sodomy immoral. Does
Blackmun mean by this charge anything other than that the traditional
dedication to inculcating virtue-a view held in our time by many who
are not religious-is itself "intolerant"? Well, whatever it is called, I am
still looking for an argument showing why this virtue inculcation, or "in109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (No. 88-605) (citations omitted).

76.
tioner's
77.
78.

The brief, unreported district court order is reprinted as Appendix II to petiSupreme Court brief.
See Transcript, supra note 25, at 7-8.
See, Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 211-13.
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tolerance," is unconstitutional. Liberal political morality can answer that
question. Any law proposing that one sexual lifestyle is morally better
than another violates the equal respect due the choices of self-defining,
autonomous persons. But where is the argument that liberal morality is
constitutionally enforceable?
I think Blackmun's dependence upon "religious intolerance" signals
more clearly than any other of his or Tribe's themes that Hardwick would
have us assume the constitutionalization of liberalism. True, Burger's
brief concurrence typifies a portion of the state's argument. The Chief
Justice writes that "[c]ondemnation of those practices is firmly rooted in
Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards."79 Burger was trying to distinguish this law's province from "mere irrational prejudice," or majority
whimsy. Revealingly, Blackmun views the attempt as further proof of the
law's irrationality. He takes this unfavorable comparison along two
routes, all the way to an equation with race discrimination. "A State can
no more punish private behavior because of religious intolerance than it
can punish such behavior because of racial animus." 0 Blackmun pronounces, "The Constitution cannot control such prejudices, but neither
can it tolerate them."' Moral insights in some way drawn from religion
have the same social value as race discrimination. So much for the Christian insight that we are all, regardless of race, color, or ethnicity, equally
God's children, a religious precept so powerfully preached by Martin Luther King, Jr.
The second avenue likens moral condemnation of sodomy from an
understanding of religion to little more than blind adherence to the inscrutable, arbitrary product of divine commands. Blackmun again used
race discrimination to illustrate:
The parallel between Loving and this case is almost uncanny. There,
too, the State relied on a religious justification of its law. Compare 388
U.S., at 3 (quoting trial court's statement that "Almighty God created
the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on
separate continents .... The fact that he separated the races shows
that he did not intend for the races to mix"), with Brief for Petitioner
20-21 (relying on the Old and New Testaments and the writings of St.
that "traditional Judeo-Christian values proThomas Aquinas to show
82
scribe such conduct").
Aquinas is becoming the bate noir of American constitutional law. In
July 1987, Justice Stevens relied upon what he incorrectly described as
Thomas' teaching to conclude that abortion restrictions were an establishment of religion. 8 Stevens' misportrayal has the same purpose as
Blackmun's: to carry liberalism's historical and theoretical brief against
79. Id. at 196 (Burger, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 211-12 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 212.
82. Id. at 210 n.5.
83. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3083 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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religion in public life to religiously grounded moral claims. The tactic is
the one seen in Hardwick: paint moral principles with the same brush of
irrationality as that used on religion, and they too can be banished from
common life. The result is the peculiar construction of Edwards v. Aguillard8 4 in which moral norms proposed by religious persons are the forbidden fruit of politics.
Liberalism purports to reverse tradition and to banish religion from
political activity and reflection. In Ronald Dworkin's words, "political decisions must be, so far as is possible, independent of any particular conception of the good life, or of what gives value to life." 85 Since religion is
typically thought to bear a fleshy account of the good life-a supposition
that is now at best, only plausible-religion is thus "privatized." Why
privatization? Jeffrey Stout answers for the entire liberal tradition in
Lockean tones: "What made the creation of liberal institutions necessary
• . . was the manifest failure of religious groups of various sorts to establish rational agreement on their competing detailed visions of the good.","
Leading liberal theorists such as John Rawls 87 and D.A.J. Richards" argue that they are simply completing Locke's work.
PART II
I maintain that the fundamental question of legal theory and political morality is not resolvable as a matter of constitutional law. Presently I
defend that view, but first I need to clarify what I mean. I have no doubt
that the founding generation, indeed the overwhelming bulk of all Americans until sometime deep into the twentieth century: (a) believed that the
law ought to enforce objective moral norms like those against homosexual
relations, (b) worked to embody that conviction in law, and (c) succeeded
in doing so. Until very recently-into the 1960's and including Griswold-the Constitution, as judicially construed, interposed no objection
to their so doing. All along very few, if any, of those people believed that
the Constitution itself required state "enforcement of morals," or even
that the Constitution addressed the subject.
Abortion is a contemporary example of this constitutional agnosticism. The Supreme Court has been caustically criticized for finding a
right to abortion-on-demand in the Constitution. But Roe's critics, including everyday "pro-lifers," do not assert the precisely opposite conclusion that the Constitution itself prohibits abortion by designating the
fetus a "person." Along with the claim of reproductive autonomy, that
option was urged upon the Roe court. My view is that neither claim was
persuasively supported by the appropriate sources-constitutional text,
structure, and precedent. So, the Constitution is indifferent on the sub84. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
85.

R. DWORKIN, A MAT=ER OF PRINCIPLE 191 (1985).

86. J. STOUT, ETHICS AFTER BABEL 212 (1988).
87. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 195-257 (1971).
88. See DA.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION (1986).
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ject of abortion.
Upon the fundamental question of political morality raised by Hardwick, the Constitution is just as nonplussed. That was the common view
of Americans at least into the Gilded Age when, for reasons still awaiting
definitive elaboration by scholars, a profound revulsion at popular lawmaking by both business and cultural elites began the Lochner revolution. That occurred within an overall transfer from popular governance to
the administrative state. I sketch in four parts a brief argument for constitutional equipoise, really just enough to warrant the conclusion plausibly. Part III remains the strongest evidence for the conclusion urged now:
the argument for liberal political morality, as in Hardwick, does not appeal at all to the Constitution or any common aids-history, structure, or
precedent-for its exposition.
The sequence proceeds as follows:
(A) the parameters of the Constitution, the matter(s)
addressed
(B) its basic institutional commitments
(C) the special case of the Bill of Rights; its content
and institutional commitments, especially its support (if any) for
judicial enforcement of a particular political morality
(D) the fourteenth amendment, its content and
institutional commitments, especially its support (if any) for a
particular political morality.
The method is simple, even obvious, but I insist not naive. I propose to
read the text. After all, only the text is the Constitution, that which the
sovereign people have made law.
A.

Our Agnostic Constitution

The Constitution is essentially agnostic because it establishes a government of limited, enumerated powers. It is not a government of "general" or "plenary" governmental power as were and are the states. The
federal Constitution grants no explicit power over religion and (as the
founders saw the matter) religion's practical adjuncts: morality and education. Nor does the national government enjoy power over public decency, domestic relations, or public health. The federal government has
no authority to maintain basic civil peace; its limited criminal jurisdiction
stems from its express powers, save for an implied right to defend its
existence against seditious conspiracy. From this alone we can conclude
that a constitutional verdict on the legal enforcement of morals would be
unexpected.
"Morals legislation" and its constitutionality could not be entirely
sidestepped. Sunday mail delivery, an exercise of the enumerated postal
power, issued in the first major engagement of the national polity with
vexing questions of religion and law that were common fare of state polit-
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ics. Revealingly, it engendered no judicial controversy.8 9 Near the turn of
the twentieth century, commercial regulation suppressed other vices, including gambling and prostitution. Judicial declarations of their constitutionality were obtained. 0 The judicial verdict relied upon the traditional
view that suppression of vice was a legitimate ingredient of the police
power. The Lottery Case,91 for instance, leaves no doubt that gambling
was thought harmful not only to society but to willing participants, and
for that reason came within Congress' "plenary power" over interstate
commerce.
These precedents, just a few years before the Pierce v. Society of
Sisterss2 and Meyer v. Nebraska" cases which Hardwick praised as precedent for unregulated "private morality," affirm that "plenary" governmental power included the option to pass morals laws. But "interstate
commerce" is a slender, ephemeral empirical hold for such a powerful
theoretical point. Fortunately, there were vast expanses in which the national government enjoyed plenary governmental power: the territories.
What did the founders do there?
On the same day that it debated the establishment clause, the House
of Representatives, without noticeable opposition, passed an ordinance of
governance for the Western Territory. 9 4 Previously passed by the Senate,
the ordinance became law with the President's signature on August 7,
1987. 91 The act effectively continued arrangements ordained by the
Northwest Ordinance of 1787, passed by the Confederation Congress on
July 13, 1787.96 The importance of the 1789 provision goes beyond the
frequently noted provision that "[rieligion, morality and knowledge, being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools
and the means of education shall forever be encouraged. '9 7 This belief
was shared by the entire founding generation and it confirms the previously mentioned verdict. It makes clear that "plenary" governmental
power most certainly encompassed more than both interstitial federal
power in the states, and the contemporary liberal conception of proper
governmental ends.
After ratification of the Bill of Rights, Congress again did not hesitate to endorse the 1787 action in its entirety. During the incumbencies of
Adams and Jefferson, the Indiana (1800)98 Michigan (1805), 99 and Illinois
89. See Brown, Prelude to Abolitionism: SabbatarianPolitics and the Rise of the
Second Party System, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV.316 (1968).
90. See Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913) (upholding Mann Act and approving earlier congressional prohibition of contested transportation of obscene material).
91. 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
92. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
93. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
94. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 685 (J. Gales, ed.). For a more detailed discussion of the
territorial regime, see G. BRADLEY,

95.
96.
97.
98.

CHURCH-STATE

RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA 97-104 (1987).

Northwest Territory Ordinance and Act, ch. VIII, 1 Stat. 50 (1787).
Id. at 51-53.
Id. at 52.
Act of May 7, 1800, ch. XLI, 2 Stat. 58.

99. Act of Jan. 11, 1805, ch. V, 2 Stat. 309.
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(1809)100 territories were organized by simple application of the Northwest Ordinance. President Madison signed the bill organizing the Missouri territory on basically the same footing, an act that explicitly
incorporated the religion and morality clause of 1787.101

Central to the significance of the 1789 reenactment is the reality, undoubtedly known to Congress, that the territories were beginning to look
like Puritan, moralistic New England. James M. Varnum, formerly Rhode
Island's representative to the Confederation Congress and by 1788 a supreme judge of the Northwest Territory, boasted in an Independence Day
address at Marietta, Ohio, that, mindful of "our" dependence on the "Supreme Will," territory residents "have not neglected the great principles
and institutions of religion."' 2 Indeed they had not. In addition to the
public lots on which their churches stood, profane swearing, blasphemy,
and Sunday labor were already prohibited.'0 3 Governor General Arthur
St. Clair, along with Varnum and Samuel Parsons, also a supreme judge,
spoke most forcefully to the former issue:
Whereas idle, vain and obscene conversation, profane cursing and
swearing, and more especially the irreverently mentioning, calling upon,
or invoking the sacred and supreme being, by any of the divine characters in which he hath graciously condescended to reveal his infinitely
beneficial purposes to mankind, are repugnant to every moral sentiment, subversive of every civil obligation, inconsistent with the ornaments of polished life,
and abhorrent to the principles of the most
04
benevolent religion.
Congress in 1800 carved Indiana Territory out of the Northwest, 0 5
leaving behind what became the state of Ohio, and until 1809 the territory comprised the present states of Indiana and Illinois.'0 6 The now-distinct Indiana legislature immediately imitated its predecessor. In 1807,
while Jefferson was president, Indiana prohibited blasphemy, profanity,
and worldly behavior on Sunday, with precisely the same $2.00 or twodays penalty.'0 7 Note that, in anticipation of subsection C: These actions
were subject to the constraints of the Bill of Rights, and many of them
were undertaken by members of early congresses who, in the very first
Congress, drafted, debated, and proposed those amendments to the states
for ratification.
Let me repeat the central point: Morals laws were an option under
our Constitution for governments of plenary power. Though almost inva100.
101.
102.
103.
Pease ed.

Act of Feb. 3, 1809, ch. XIII, 2 Stat. 514.
Act of June 4, 1812, ch. XCV, 2 Stat. 743.
Massachusetts Centinel, July 1, 1789, at 1.
2 COLLECTIONS OF THE ILLINOIS STATE HISTORICAL LIBRARY 21 (Law Series, T.
1930).

104. Id.
105. Act of May 7, 1800, ch. XLI, 2 Stat. 58.
106. Act of Feb. 34, 1809, ch. XIII, 2 Stat. 514.

107. Id. at 367.
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riably exercised, no one to my knowledge suggests they are mandatory,
that Congress must pass such laws. A few people may think they have a
"right" to live in a decent society, one in which morals laws are passed
and enforced. But this is the "mandatory" claim rephrased, and it is still
wrong. The precise meaning of "agnostic": The question of morals laws is
subsumed by the characteristic feature of our Constitution. It is up to the
people, and their representatives-in other words, collective selfgovernment.
B.

Institutional Commitments

If a prominent feature of the federal Constitution is its enumeration
of powers, a featured sub-theme is the composition of institutions to exercise those powers. A glance at the document leaves no doubt where the
powerhouse is: on Capitol Hill, in a carefully crafted, bicameral legislature. This is our, or at least the founders', profound commitment to collective self-government. The obvious procedural mechanism is
majoritarianism. Is it so unthinkable to us that the founders might have
achieved their goal of composing a legislative branch and tethering it sufficiently to the people to yield a vigorous yet restrained government?
Why can't Madison be right, that (as he argued in the Federalist) the
process can check itself, especially since Madison identified as his nemesis
the current villain: majoritarianism.
Madison allowed that, in a republic majorities were the chief threats
to what he called "private rights." 10 8 So much followed from the definition of republics as "popular governments": since the majority possesses
ultimate political power, it may do wrong with intrasystemic impunity.
Yet it does not occur to Madison that this gives rise to a "dilemma"
which the Constitution, judicially interpreted, might solve. Not even a bill
of rights suggested to Madison a-much less the decisive--constitutional
role for judges. He well understood that exactly because in a republic the
people had final power to do wrong they-and not judges-need to be
persuaded to do right. Madison wrote to Jefferson in 1788, before proposing amendments to Congress:
What use, then, it may be asked, can a bill of rights serve in popular
Governments? I answer, the two following, which though less essential
than in other Governments, sufficiently recommend the precaution: 1.
The political truths declared in that solemn manner acquire by degrees
the character of fundamental maxims of free Government, and as they
become incorporated with the National sentiment, counteract the impulses of interest and passion. 2. Although it be generally true, as above
stated, that the danger of oppression lies in the interested majorities of
the people rather than in usurped acts of the Government, yet there
may be occasions on which the evil may spring from the latter source;
and on such, a bill of rights will be a good ground for an appeal to the
sense of the community.10 9

108. See,

THE FEDERALMST

No. 10, at 80 (J. Madison) (Mentor ed. 1961).
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Madison's "illiberalism" can be distilled from Federalist 10 and 51.
There, Madison commits the mortal sin of entrusting even religious conflict to majoritarian organs, not to an independent judiciary. In Federalist
10, he argues that the "variety of [religious] sects dispersed over the entire face of [the United States], must secure the national Councils against
any danger from that source." 110 The same enlarged sphere-the "extent
and proper structure of the Union"-secured against "a rage for paper
money, for an abolition of debts, for the equal division of property, or for
any other improper or wicked project."'" Security for all kinds of rights
"consists in the greater obstacles opposed [by the extended republic] to
the concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and
interested majority." 1 2
Madison thought Congress was the constitutionally appropriate
branch to define and secure civil rights. "In a free government, the security for civil rights must be the same as for religious rights. It consists in
the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other, in the multiplicity of sects.' 1 '

As Gary Glenn so forcefully points out, Madison's

argument makes no sense except on the assumption that Congress is to
secure civil rights through "a coalition of a majority of the whole society
[which] could seldom take place on any other principles than those of
justice and the general good.""'
The suggestion is that the Constitution represents a massive institutional commitment to collective self-government. The first part of the argument is already made: legislative supremacy. 5 The second part
recovers some forgotten facts about our "independent" judiciary; facts
which demolish the implicit constitution of liberalism. It is not only the
affirmative case so far made, that government seems almost entirely committed to Congress. Nor is it only that, as subsections C and D show, the
Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amendment reinforce rather than undercut this commitment. Here the spotlight is on the negative implication; specifically, the constitutionally impossible role liberalism defends
for the independent judiciary.
The historical record reveals that ratification was accomplished more
in spite of, than because of, an independent federal judiciary." 6 Popular
opinion suspected an alien force intruding upon that local self-government carried on by the county court. More prosaically, many feared en1 WRITINGS OF MADISON 426 (1865).
110. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 84 (J. Madison) (Mentor ed. 1961).
111. Id.
112. Id.
109.

113.

Id. at 324.

114. G. Glenn (unpublished manuscript available from the author). The discussion in
the text is indebted to Glenn's fine work.
115. For a discussion of legislative supremacy, see Bradley, Law Enforcement and the
Separation of Powers, 30 ARiz. L. REV. 801 (1988).
116. See G. BRADLEY, supra note 94, at 72.
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forcement of debts they might escape locally. 117 Theoretically, a powerful
current of thought articulated by Jefferson carried separation of powers
thinking to its conclusion: frequent, popular election of judges.11 As it
was, federal judicial power was limited to "national" issues and to cases
plausibly threatened by local interests. 11 9 In this light, the national judiciary was an aspect of the problem of federalism, not rights versus collective interests or any recognizable prototype of that construction.
Were this independent judiciary expected to play such a role, the
Constitution would have to have said more about judicial review itself.
Certainly its existence could not have been left to implication. More important, the critical questions of constitutional lawmaking-not the existence of judicial review, but its scope, the authoritativeness and finality of
Supreme Court decisions, and the role of Congress in constitutional determinations-would have been resolved. To say in defense of the liberal
construction that judicial review was then in its infancy does not help the
case. Its future growth was not foreseeable, and no theory of government
or political morality predicated upon its mature shape can therefore be
attributed to the founders. In any event, Congress played the role of patriarch in some societies: It had authority to abandon the child at any
time.
Congress could have limited Supreme Court jurisdiction to the insignificant Article III grants of original jurisdiction.1 20 Indeed, Congress need
not have created lower federal courts at all. Combined, the Constitution
contemplates Congress choosing to leave all questions of substantive federal constitutional law for final resolution by state courts. Those courts
were often staffed by elected officials. In any event, there was no constitutional insurance that state judges be "independent" in any sense at all. As
it was, Congress created federal courts but generally provided for concurrent state and federal jurisdiction over constitutional questions. Even
then, only in 1816121 did the Supreme Court conclusively (and correctly)
affirm its power to review state court decisions on constitutional law. The
point remains: The profound disagreements about the nature and extent
of all national power which make up the history of our constitutional law
until the verge of this century preclude the pivotal role for the federal
judiciary posited by liberalism. The entire national government, including
Congress, could not until recently be imagined superintending political
life coast-to-coast in the way Hardwick would have the Supreme Court.
C. The Bill of Rights
It is useful to begin here by taking a look at the text. Despite much
recent turgid talk of its devotion to individual dignity and autonomy, the
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
See Bradley, supra note 115, at 820-21.
See U.S. CONST., art III, § 2, cl. 1.
See id. at cl.2.
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 1 (1 Wheat) 304 (1816).
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Bill of Rights actually talks of "the people's" rights much more than the
rights of persons. To the founders, "the people" was a conventional formulation, and was no synonym for an aggregate of individuals. 12 2 Ronald
Peters argues (in specific reference to the Massachusetts Constitution of
1780) that the term "the people" was used consciously, and that it denoted an entity distinct from any individual, group of individuals, or even
all individuals. 123 Peters concludes that this conception was central to the
thinking of Massachusetts residents and that their political thinking cannot be understood apart from it." 24 Our Bill of Rights is also incompre-

hensible without aid of this concept.
This concept of popular rights stems from the theoretical situation in
which the founders found themselves after the Revolution. The Revolution was basically fought over the principle of self-rule, the right of the
people to make the laws by which they were to be governed. "Autonomy"
it was, but to the founders that meant freedom of the political community to chart its own course-in short, collective self-government. It is
also fair to say that the predominant connotation of "freedom" or "liberty" was this popular sovereignty. "We, the People" delegate governmental authority to the governors but do not transfer sovereignty.
Indeed, "when in the course of human events" the people deem it necessary to do so, they may exercise their residual sovereign authority to dissolve a government and establish another in its stead. This is our
theoretical wake up call: The political community exists independently of
the government, and (in a sense) continually monitors it. Not only intrasystemically will the community, inevitably acting through a majority,
have its way.
Historian Gordon Wood probably goes too far in suggesting that the
more contemporary connotation of "autonomy" hardly existed in the
Revolutionary era.125 But, surprisingly, the Bill of Rights is scarcely devoted to what we now call "autonomy"-the freedom of individuals to be
governed by certain laws, especially by "liberal" ones, notwithstanding
the community's contrary disposition. The only explicit mention of "individual" guarantees at all are in the fifth 2 and sixth amendments," 27
122. See R.

(1978).
123.
124.
125.
126.

PETERS, THE MASSACHUSETTS

CONSTITUTION,

Id.
Id.
G.WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
The fifth amendment states:

REPUBLIC

A SOcIAL

COMPACT

44 n.2

1776-1787 61-62 (1967).

No person shall be held t6 answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of
War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, with-

out just

compensation.

U.S. CONST. amend. V.

127. The sixth amendment states:
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which are important but nevertheless procedural guarantees. Even so,
grand jury indictment and jury trial in the vicinage partake more of the
dominant connotation of "autonomy," collective self-government. They
protect individuals by placing persons at the mercy of the people, or at
least a cross-section of them. Of course, the community was then thought
a protection against government oppression, not an accomplice to it. The
seventh amendment 128 guarantee of civil jury trial shares this purpose.
These are no idle protections. I for one doubt very much that every
member of a twelve-person jury drawn would have convicted Michael
Hardwick, even if a majority of twenty-three grand jurors returned a true
bill. Indeed, much of Tribe's argument would make a great closing argument for the defense to such a jury. Allen Steinberg's recent work on
criminal justice in Philadelphia, circa 1800-1880, indicates just how profoundly "political," as in conducive to popular self-government, the criminal trial was for much of our history. 129 It still is.

Almost the entire balance of the Bill of Rights specifies "rights of the
people." The third amendment 1 30 implicitly reveals the theoretical dynamic. Protecting against forced quartering of soldiers during peacetime
does resonate with modern notions of individual privacy. Even so, this
"substantive" guarantee of privacy is penultimate, for quartering is permissible "in a manner prescribed by law." In other words, so long as expressed regularly through the lawmaking process, the "right" of the
people to make laws overrides here another putative "right" of individuals to be governed in accord with certain norms. The first amendment 31
is only somewhat different. It speaks explicitly of the people's right to
assemble and petition, which are adjuncts of self-government. Freedom of
speech and of the press were also then, if not now, likely understood as
instruments more of popular sovereignty than of individual expression.
That leaves the religious guarantees for further examination. I have arIn all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process of obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
128. The seventh amendment states:
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dol-

lars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by jury, shall
be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to
the rules of the common law.
U.S. CONsT. amend. VII.
129. A. STEINBERG, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1989).
130. The third amendment states: "No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in
any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be
prescribed by law." U.S. CONST. amend. III.
131. The first amendment states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press' or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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gued at length elsewhere that nonestablishment is a structural adjustment whose purpose and effect was to insure full political participation
by all sects, so that the political process could protect those sects from
unfriendly legislation. 132 It was grease for the machinery of Federalist 10.
And notwithstanding the admitted individualistic appearance
of free ex133
ercise, its province was, in my opinion, communal.

The right of the people specified by the fourth amendment"" was not
apprehended by its ratifiers to refer to an individual's entitlement to particular laws. That is what we think. But the plain meaning, historically
recovered, is this: the people's right to govern search and seizure through
laws of their choosing. That is the "right of the people," and individuals
have no claim to 35
be governed by particular laws other than the ban on
1
general warrants.

D. The Fourteenth Amendment
The text of the fourteenth amendment appears in the footnotes3l'
and I doubt that many constitutional law professors could pass a quiz on
132. See Bradley, The No-Religious Test Clause and the Constitution of Religious
Liberty: A Machine That Has Gone of Itself, 37 CASE W. RES. 674-747 (1987).
133. See Bradley, Commentary on West and Garvey, 4 NOTRE DAME J. OF L., ETHICS,
AND PUB. POL'y 639 (1990).
134. The fourth amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.

135. See Bradley, The Constitutional Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 38 DE PAUL
L. REV. 817-72 (1989).

136. The fourteenth amendment states:
SECTION 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
SECTION 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in
each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United
States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a
State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male
inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the
United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or
other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative n Congress, or
elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military,
under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an
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it. The vast bulk of the enactment-sections two through four-do present little direction for contemporary problems. But on the face they
carry the fundamental message of the entire amendment: re-construction
of the southern states on a footing of collective self-government, with federal insurance that all persons, including blacks, are members of the body
politic. Looked at this way, the amendment is a remarkable ode to
America's then continuing confidence in self-governance.
This fundamental message must influence us even as we attend the
exposition of discrete clauses like "due process" and "equal protection."
This is not the occasion to rehash the judicial operation whereby "due
process" was disfigured into "due substance." Sufficient for present purposes is the observation that everyone agrees the due process clause's predominant understanding prior to the Lochner revolution was in accord
with extant (positive) law of the land." It is true that the privileges and
immunities clause was-and should still be--"substantive" in an important sense which firmly distinguishes it from "process." I must leave full
discussion of the issues thereby raised to a forthcoming book.13 7 Now I
simply assert that even the privileges and immunities clause, so rendered,
does not get us to where substantive due process has taken us.
It will help to read the equal protection clause in its straightforward
sense, which reveals that the only word usually cited-"equal"-is the
one word which is practically redundant. "All persons," that is, every single human being, are to enjoy the "protection" of the state's law. What
this means is simple enough. Laws against rape, for instance, are for the
protection of blacks as well as whites. More pointedly, laws against murder, which includes lynching by citizen mobs, are for the protection of
both blacks and whites. No one at all is to be permitted by selective or
lax enforcement to remain outside the legal community in a virtual state
of nature. This intention is supplemented by the due process clause
which effectively prohibits the converse: no extralegal enforcement action
oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a
member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any

State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in
insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof. But Congress may be a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such

disability.
SECTION 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, author-

ized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for
services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion shall not be questioned. But

neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any
claim for the loss of emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations

and claims shall be held illegal and void.
SECTION 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
137. Tentative title of the work in progress: PLAIN MEANING, HISTORICALLY RECOVERED:
RESTORING THE CONsTrruTION TO CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (to

Littlefield).

be published by Rowman &

1990]

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

to the detriment of the life, liberty, and property interest of any person.
Neither of these clauses directly relates to "state laws" to be reviewed by
federal courts. The ad-hoc, extra-legal quality of the prohibited acts suggests an extremely limited remedial (e.g., habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition) role for federal courts. Presumably, prophylactic legislation
would be necessary to redeem these pledges.
This account of equal protection and due process highlights the continuity between it and the founding commitment to collective self-government. The founders fought for and established the autonomy of the
American people, their freedom from political domination, so that the
laws by which they were governed were their own. The fourteenth amendment says, in effect: It is by those laws, and not by extra-legal action or
inaction of state officials, that we all shall be governed.
Historical recovery reenforces that interpretation. It counsels legislative activism. Fortunately, the only explicit textual reference to "enforcement" of these guarantees is to congress. Any judicial involvement at all
is implied. Indeed, the intuitively plausible role for courts would be to
vindicate, by adjudication and issuance of remedies, what Congress
thinks equality entails. The federal insurer is popular-indeed,
majoritarian-not judicial.
Legal historian William Nelson relates the "embryonic form" of the
fourteenth amendment: Congress shall have "power to make all laws necessary and proper to secure to all persons in every State within this
Union equal protection in their rights of life, liberty and property."' 38 It
provides no role for the judiciary at all! This is in accordance with the
sentiment which produced the amendment. Nelson writes that the fourteenth amendment was "understood less as a legal instrument to be elaborated on in the Courts than as a peace treaty to be administered by
Congress. 138 While some "self-executing" effect was intended, there remained no doubt that this was primarily an empowerment of Congress.
Putting together these pieces-non-technical generality, Congressional
power-yields a sum by which almost all contemporary jurisprudence
could not be more at odds with the original understanding. It seems that
even the Civil War amendments and their framers still believed the people, via effective politics, would reconstruct the South, redeem Lincoln's
pledges to the emancipated slaves, and re-establish the Republic sundered by secession and bloodied by war.
PART III
Part I argued that Hardwick presents for constitutional resolution
the fault line of contemporary political morality, more or less the fundamental alternatives in contemporary legal philosophy. Part II warranted
the provisional conclusion that the Constitution does not arbitrate the
dispute. The Hardwick majority assumed this position. They are respect138. W.
139.

NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

Id. at 110.

49 (1988).
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ful of the Constitution and faithful to the traditional judicial interpretation of it. Under normal conditions, this faithfulness and questions
pertaining to its execution will appear operationally as a reflection about
methodology: how to go about adjudication in constitutional cases with
"legitimacy," consistent with the initial commitment to collective selfgovernment. Any acceptable methodology will cleave closely to textualism
which, by being historically grounded, will protect against erosion of that
commitment. Whether this amounts to genuine or spurious "objectivity"
in any other sense is unimportant. This method is certainly not "objective," as in neutral among world views or individual aspirations, redolent
of a Rawlsian "original position." Additions to the text, like "substantive
due process" ought, if ventured at all, to be undertaken with both hands
firmly holding tradition. Such adventures will then be a fairly modest enterprise, typified not by Lochner but by Pierce140 and Meyer:"' staying
the course during periods of destabilization.
However, the Hardwick dissent (Blackmun, joined by Marshall, Stevens, and Brennan) and Tribe (in his brief, oral argument, and treatise in
American ConstitutionalLaw) claim the judicial tradition as their own.
Is this dispute similarly inarbitrable? Fortunately it is not. The dissenters
are the heretics. Inquire beyond assertions of orthodoxy to the decisive
question: How do they prove their orthodox, that is, what reasons are
given, what texts are cited, what propositions are offered?
There is no reasonable doubt that their argument does not rely upon
the constitutional text. What Phillip Kurland once said about the Court's
church-state decisions is here appropros: The Constitution has been an
excuse, not a reason, for the opinions. 42 That is easily proved by meditating upon the text "interpreted" by Hardwick: "No state ... shall...

deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of
law.' 4' It is no more suggestive of decision if the effects of "incorporation" are brought into view. Then we are supposed to resolve the issue as
one of-or all of.-"free speech" or protection against "unreasonable
search and seizure" or quartering soldiers in the home. This is still a long
way from warranting an answer to the contested question: Is the moral
soundness of individuals a legitimate purpose for the exercise of state police power? The happy coincidence, until quite recently, of laws so predicated and all these constitutional provisions, suggests that no historicallygrounded account of constitutional lawmaking by the judiciary, including
a "due substance" clause stuffed by the traditions of the people, may justify the claim. From the nineteenth century until 1960, all fifty states had
laws like Georgia's." A wave of repeal has since eliminated twenty-six,"4
140. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
141. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
142. Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 VILL. L. REv. 3, 14 (1978).
143. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
144. See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 193-94.
145. Id.
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was the first judicial declaration of constitutional invabut only in 1980
1
lidity obtained.

41

It is not so much that the constitutional text is clay in the blackrobed potters' hands. At least then the materials-the clay-limit the
possibilities for design. No, we are talking here about creation ex nihilo.
There is only some pretense to the contrary. The first signs of concession
are easily ascertained. An undifferentiated "first amendment," rather
than the collection actually strung together there by the first Congress, is
paraded. Then, "privacy" or "autonomy" or some other shorthand is substituted for the more motley collection making up the Bill of Rights.
Griswold147 trafficked in this runaway conflation. I call its methodology
the "in-de-ductive" method of constitutional lawmaking. "Induction" refers to a general analytical technique which first investigates all relevant
phenomena, and seeks in them a common principle. "Deduction" starts
from an intuited or self-evident principle, and proceeds to derive implications. Griswold did both: It surveyed the entire Constitution, particularly
the Bill of Rights, and decided that "privacy" was a common element. A
"general" right to privacy was christened an autonomous principle. From
it, desired conclusions-like contraceptive use or abortion-on-demand-are confidently drawn. The trick, or the pay-off, is that neither
conclusion could persuasively be drawn from any single constitutional
clause. Once this equation of the Constitution with regard to "privacy" is
made, the willing judge is relieved of anchorage in the now transcended
text to pursue pre-analytical commitments.
The above is suggestive. One can easily make the case for atextualism
by looking at Blackmun's method in Hardwick. Blackmun states: "I believe we must analyze respondent Hardwick's claim in the light of the
values that underlie the constitutional right to privacy. If that right
means anything, it means that, before Georgia can prosecute [Hardwick],
it must .

.

."

Note the progression away from the text until it is com-

pletely out of sight. Start now with a bulk right called "privacy," itself
tethered to the Constitution most tenuously. Then determine (how is unspecified, but one suspects further recourse to a preferred, nonconstitutional vision) its underlying values. Top all of this off with flat assertion:
"If this means anything, it means .

.

. " and you have, I submit, com-

pletely removed the Constitution from constitutional law. We may not
yet know where we are going, but we are certainly on our way.
Genuine "authority," in Blackmun's hands, is precedent, and consists
almost entirely of citation to post-Griswold "privacy" cases. I return to
those precedents shortly but, should they turn out to be the sole "authorities," the argument would indisputably be a judicial construction of the
last twenty or so years. The purpose here is to examine the claims of
authority by Blackmun-and by Tribe-to a handful of earlier cases. (I
take up Griswold separately). Tribe refers to "principles of private liberty
146.
147.
148.

See People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980).
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 199-200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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endorsed by the Court since the 1920's, '1 and to Meyer v. Nebraska and
Skinner v. Oklahoma.150 Blackmun notes the third case usually included
in this pedigree, Pierce v. Society of Sisters.'5" Observe what they stand
for, and gauge their "authority" for the constitutional law defended by
Hardwick.
The doctrinal pigeon-holing of these cases is disputed. Tribe considers Pierce a free exercise case, 52 as does Robert Bork.' 53 Bork at one time
saw it as I would and as Blackmun seems to see it: a substantive due
process decision.'" Part of this dispute owes to Pierce's timing. It invalidated a state law before the free exercise clause was incorporated; as far
as the self-understanding of the Pierce court went, it could only be a
fourteenth amendment case. Meyer might now be seen as a free speech
case-Bork so classifies it'5 5-- and it was decided after incorporation.
Still, the opinion itself seems oblivious to that judicial coup. Skinner'
dealt with forced sterilization of habitual criminals and appears to be a
direct ancestor of the reproductive rights of Roe v. Wade, 5 ' Eisenstadt v.
Baird 58, and cohort. In any event, let us assume what I take to be the
claim about the cases by Blackmun and Tribe: they all defeated state
legislation in favor of some "private liberty" or "right" that is not persuasively linked to the text, but which nevertheless resembles that argued for
in Hardwick. What follows that is relevant to Hardwick? Answer: nothing
important, and almost nothing at all. Of course, if one asked the Pierce
and Meyer Courts whether they were saying anything that warranted
Hardwick's claim, their answer would be no. As mentioned, only a few
years earlier they affirmed congressional vice laws. Anyway, these cases do
share a certain methodological latitude. They articulate some extra-textual principle of decision, which might have been called "privacy" (but
was not), even if it does not articulate a "right" to oral sex. This much
the cases share not only with Hardwick and Roe but also with Lochner v.
New York,

59

Plessy v. Ferguson,8 0 and Scott v. Sandford,'2 none of

which are cited as authority by either Tribe or Blackmun. But all are
extratextual. Scott and Lochner are commonly seen as "substantive due
process" cases. Plessy's "separate but equal" rule, in my opinion, has no
basis in either constitutional text or history, and is a "substantive" equal
L. TRBE, supra note 6, at 1430.
150. Id. at 1429.
151. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)).
152. L. TRIBE, supra note 6, at 1415.
153. R. BORK, supra note 70, at 49.
154. See Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND, L.J.
1, 11 (1971).
155. R. BORK, supra note 70, at 49.
156. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
157. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
149.

158.

405 U.S. 438 (1972).

159. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
160. 163 U.S. 537 (1942).
161. 60 U.S. (19 Har.) 393 (1856).
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protection case. Plessy self-consciously articulated a right of association

(social, not intimate) that could not be overridden by state laws.
No wonder those extratextuals are slighted in favor of "good" cases
like Pierce, Meyer, and Skinner. But insofar as the major similarity-that of a methodology which escapes the text to articulate
"rights"-Lochner is just as relevant. Indeed, the Pierce and Meyer
Courts proclaimed themselves within the Lochner tradition: The Meyer
Court cited Lochner,'6 2 and the Pierce Court said it followed Meyer. 163
All are not only substantive due process cases, they are all liberty of contract cases. If there is a "fundamental right" articulated or at work in
Meyer and Pierce, it is the right of parents and teachers to economic
freedom, the latter to pursue a lawful calling without unreasonable interference from the state; the former to engage teachers so employed to educate their children without hindrance by such regulations. Indeed, Pierce
is not even a proto-free exercise case. A co-plaintiff in that case was a
private, non-sectarian school, both plaintiffs were corporations, and the
Court expressly recognized that deprivation of property, due to the effective closure of the schools for lack of students, was at issue.
There are genuine Lochner cases, and so it is to Lochner and progeny
that we are supposed to appeal for authority in Hardwick. This irony is
compounded by Holmes' dissent in Meyer."' The difficulty is heightened
by what little the cases say about state power over the moral soundness of
individuals. Despite some talk of fundamental rights, including a laundry
list familiar from the Slaughterhouse Cases,165 the precise holding in each
case is the same: The state has needlessly interfered with the liberty to
pursue a lawful calling and, much less prominently, some right of family
autonomy. That is, the statutes were not reasonably related to a legitimate governmental end. They were arbitrary. To really stand for something like Hardwick's claim, that "end" would have to be virtue
inculcation or a cognate, and the Court would have to pronounce it illegitimate. In fact, the end pursued in Pierce and Meyer is something like
social solidarity. At least, the "parochialism" of insular ethnic and religious communities seems at odds with the end in view. This is not the
same as concern for individual moral well-being. However, the posited
ends are legitimate, and the opinions each make clear, if only in passing,
that the moral quality of individual citizens is a legitimate state concern. 66 The critical jurisprudential move is the Court's independent judgment that, contrary to the state's assertions, instruction in foreign
language or private schools are not harmful, and do not endanger the
state interest in social solidarity.
These cases constitutionalized "rights" that were already established
by legislative tradition. "Parochial education" (to use a broad term en162. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
163. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35.
164. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 412 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
165. See id. at 399.
166. See id. at 401; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534.
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compassing both private sectarian education and the kind of public
school instruction in Meyer) had, despite great opposition, secured a firm
foothold in the nineteenth century. If the tradition is as strong as its constitutionalizing proponents claim, most jurisdictions will honor that tradition. Those that do not are probably temporarily deranged. The nativism
which produced the laws struck down in Pierce and Meyers did indeed
pass. I doubt very much whether those laws would have long survived. I
say that not in the least because either nativism or anti-Catholicism (the
social forces behind the legislation in Pierce and Meyer) have been transitory fascinations to the American people. Quite the contrary- Catholic
schools have survived much greater perils than those present in the
1920's, and have survived because of countervailing political commitments to them not only by Catholics but by others in political coalitions,
specifically, the Democratic Party.
Judicial "rescues" in the 1920's-such as they were-do not compensate for the difficulties wrought by the Supreme Court upon Catholic
schools. The analysis in parts I and III of this article suggests that the
type of "extra-constitutional" judicial ordering for which these cases offer
authority is no friend of ethnic and religious minorities hugging traditional ways. Those parts specify a public morality of "autonomy" at war
with the moral and spiritual heteronomy of Roman Catholicism.
Skinner presents a still more unusual situation. It is not a "due substance" case at all. It is really about equal protection, with a subtext on
procedural due process. Oklahoma had provided by statute for proceedings to be instituted against those thrice convicted of "felonies involving
moral turpitude.' 1 67 Notice, opportunity to be heard, and a jury trial were
provided to resolve two issues: (1) was the defendant a "habitual criminal," and (2) could the sterilization be performed safely?'6 8 The statute
conclusively presumed that habitual criminality was genetically transmitted. That this issue was not rebuttable by the defendant formed the basis
of Chief Justice Stone's concurrence. 6" The majority found an equal protection violation. All were doubtlessly animated in their concern for one
of the "basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.' 7 This elaboration
smacks of social utility and resonates with what the Court expressly allowed: constitutional involuntary sterilization of "habitual criminals."
Only Justice Jackson doubted, in dictum, that a "majority" might be able
to have its way with an individual on such a matter.17 '
The reason for the decision was the almost whimsical categorization
of crimes involving moral turpitude. Apparently arbitrary classifications
were at work. "When the law lays an unequal hand on those who have
committed intrinsically the same quality of offense and sterilizes one and
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536-37.
Id. at 537.
Id. at 543-45.
Id. at 543.
See id. at 546.
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not the other, it has made as invidious a discrimination as if it had selected a particular race or nationality for oppressive treatment."'' 2 In
other words, this scheme has no reasonable relation whatsoever to the
presumed end of the legislation, public safety. This conclusion is simply
inapposite to the Hardwick question.
Griswold is almost invariably cited first in the string of contemporary
"privacy" cases, and the link has been recently tightened by enthusiasts
of Roe to put abortion rights in the same constitutional basket with contraceptive rights. Griswold does share some of the methodological heterodoxy of Lochner and Roe, but that says little. Griswold simply cannot
support Hardwick for the simple reason that, as the Eisenstadt Court
admitted as it was about to turn Griswold on its head, Griswold struck
down "an unconstitutional infringement of the right of marital privacy. ' ' 17 3 Eisenstadt simply redefined marriage-hence, "marital privacy"-by reducing it to its individual, constituent parts.
How then is the revolution supported? Essentially by flat assertion.
Here, in order, are the central "justificatory" passages for the three bedrock cases, Stanley, Eisenstadt, and Roe:
Stanley: "If the First Amendment means anything,
it means that
174
[Stanley can watch what he pleases at home].'
Eisenstadt: "If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of

the individual, married or single, to [make his or her own procreation
decisions] ."175
Roe: "This right of privacy [wherever it is in the Constitution]
is broad
enough to encompass [the right to abortion-on-demand].' 1 78
Now, Justice Blackmun, in Hardwick: "If that right [of privacy] means
anything, it means' 7 7[that Georgia must justify to the judiciary its proscription of sodomy.]'
There is more to Blackmun's argument, but this is the climax of the
story. The question remains: how to persuade that liberal political morality in the Constitution is the socially authoritative, architectonic principle. Which is to say, that it is the constitutional master principle. The
answer recognizes that the contested issue is one of legal theory. Legal
theory, as John Finnis notes, is part of social theory, and a methodologi17
cally critical social theory is determined by moral and political theory.
Even from the perspective of critical thought, a particular legal theory
depends for its validity upon an encompassing account of little less than
human being and reality. In that sense, legal philosophy is "contingent"
upon a broader account of human experience. A legal theory also depends
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. at 541.
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972) (emphasis added).
Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565.
Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 438 (emphasis in original).
Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 199.
Finnis, The Authority of Law in the Predicament of ContemporarySocial The-

ory, 1 NOTRE DAME J. op L., ETHICS, AND PUB. POL'Y 115 (1984).
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for its intelligibility and attractiveness (in an everyday sense) upon the
extant web of social relations, propositions, and institutions. That is,
before even a "true" (i.e., verified by critical reason) political philosophy
can be "enculturated"-adopted by persons in a concrete society organized for action in history as a reason for authoritative political action- it
needs a hospitable cultural environment. It must "fit" with prevailing
customs and laws as well as existing political institutions.
The obvious way to "reconstitute," or constitute anew, a society is by
direct appeal to an entirely different paradigm of social and individual
life. From that may be derived a legal philosophy with which the Constitution can be retooled. This is precisely what the Hardwick dissent proposed. Its direct, unmediated appeal to a reconstituted social reality is
unprecedented. Its audacity suggests why.
Part I chipped away at some of the covering gloss. That task needs
now to be completed before the horizon is brought into view. In legal
theoretical terms, liberal political morality and its campaign against religious and moral (i.e., perfectionist) incursions upon public life can work
only for as long as strategic devices. Practically, liberalism will not long
be able to do both of the following: keep the loyalty of a society comprising religious believers and prevent their religious conceptions of social
life from turning the polity illiberal. 179 The problem is especially acute, if
not unsolvable, when the controlling document-our Constitution-creates a government for, by, and of the people. What must eventually happen, historically if not logically, is replacement of traditional
personalities, customs, and mores with "liberal" personalities, customs,
and mores. Transported to the world of judicial opinion writing, liberal
political morality will be justified, or "sold," by redefining who we are and
what a human being is. That is precisely what Hardwick attempts.
How much of contemporary "living Constitution" talk is captured by
the following two samples of the new "conspeak"? One is a 1985 Brennan
speech widely regarded as the manifesto of liberal constitutionalism. Justice Brennan praised the "transformative purpose of the text."'' s0 What
text? What was being "transformed"? The Constitution was intended to
make a new society.'"' The Civil War amendments were designed to
"make over the world.' 8 2 This is not a constitution but a blueprint for
the ideal society. "For the Constitution is a sublime oration on the dignity of man"; 183 it "embodies the aspiration to social justice, brotherhood
and human dignity that brought this nation into being.' 8 4 The amended
Constitution is no less than "the lodestar for our aspirations."'18 No men179. See B. Lenk, Foundations of American Civil Religion 187 (unpublished doctoral
dissertation).
180. W. Brennan, "The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification," (available from the author).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1.
185. Id.
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tion here of collective self-government, but lots about the ideals that any
government (as Brennan sees it) should abide. The text (which might refract those ideals through allocation of institutional competences) is effaced. "We read the Constitution in the only way we can: as Twentieth
Century Americans. ' ' s
Tribe is more brazen. He confesses that the Constitution contains
"no discussion of the right to be a human being."' 87 The judiciary will fill

in the gap. Judges have "reached into the Constitution's spirit and structure, and [have] elaborated from the spare text an idea of the 'human'
and a conception of 'being' not merely contemplated but required." 88 Evidently this was done by "humane" constitutional law, which is now
frankly equated with a philosophy of "human beingness."
Blackmun is no less philosophically inebriated. In what now conclusively appears to be the justificatory paragraph, he wrote in Hardwick:
We protect those rights not because they contribute, in some direct and
material way, to the general public welfare, but because they form so
central a part of an individual's life. "[T]he concept of privacy embodies the 'moral fact that a person belongs to himself and not others nor
to society as a whole.'" Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. at 777, n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring),
quoting Fried, Correspondence, 6 Phil. & Pub. Affairs 288-289 (1977).

And so we protect the decision whether to marry precisely because marriage "is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial
or social projects." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S., at 486. We protect the decision whether to have a child because parenthood alters so
dramatically an individual's self-definition, not because of demographic
considerations or the Bible's command to be fruitful and multiply. Cf.
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,

supra, at 777, n.6 (Stevens, J., concurring). And we protect the family
because it contributes so powerfully to the happiness of individuals, not
because of a preference for stereotypical households. Cf. Moore v. East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. at 500-506 (plurality opinion). The Court recognized in Roberts, 468 U.S., at 619, that the "ability independently to
define one's identity that is central to any concept of liberty" cannot
truly be exercised in a vacuum; we all depend on the "emotional enrichment from close ties with others."' 189

Therein resides the terminus of all arguments on Hardwick's behalf.
Note first the caliber of "authority" Blackmun trades in. That entire paragraph contains but two statements of "law," in the sense of ratified by a
majority of Justices. One, the Griswold periscope, actually runs contrary
to Hardwick's argument. The other, from Roberts, contributes something
but is clearly doing menial work. The rest of the paragraph contains scattered judicial statements, not authority. The critical passage is from a
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
L. TRmIE, supra note 6, at 1308.
Id.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 204-05.
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scholar, Charles Fried. For that matter, the paragraph is densely
overpopulated. The "right to intimate association," for example, is reducible to a more fundamental right to define oneself, to be (in Tribe's formulation) "master of the identity [I] create in the world." '1 10 So do the
remaining statements about marriage, family and the Jaycees (Roberts).
Therefore, Blackmun observes:
[That] individuals define themselves in a significant way through
their intimate sexual relationships with others suggests, in a Nation as
diverse as ours, that there may be many 'right' ways of conducting
those relationships, and that much of the richness of a relationship will
come from the freedom one individual has to choose the form and nature of these intensely personal bonds.19'
As Russell Hittinger has summarized, legal uses of "autonomy," "expression," and self-determination are "various modalities" of a right to be
self-defining. "Privacy" and "conscience" are two more commodious
shorthands. 92 The expressive self is the new collossus of constitutional
law. In Hittinger's apt phrase, "[a]rt... has become the central analogue
for what is to be valued in human agency."" 3
This is quite new, quite culturally specific, and forms a cult of subjectivity. That the uniqueness "of each persons should lead to a conception of life in which the goal is the formation and expression of one's own
personality is an idea foreign to ancient or medieval thought."' 9 Any society, past or present, determined by Eastern religion and spirituality
would find the cult idolatrous, worshipping an illusion.'95 But the notion
of a self-defining individual, creating an identity through successive
choices which are themselves no subject of moral evolution save for harmful effects upon others, also could not be sustained-if thinkable at
all-until recently in Western societies. The apex of the moral life until
recently was attunement to an order of being not of one's making, and
the medium was freely willed acts. Indeed, the apex of that spiritual tradition was kenosis, self-emptying so that, as Paul said, "it is not I who
live but He who lives in me."' 96 Until the 1960's, no Supreme Court case
could talk of the "moral" fact that we belong to ourselves for the simple
reason that in a culture of traditional believers and regardless of rights
against government, "morally," people thought they belonged to God.
That is why Blackmun pointedly pits Biblical morality against self-definition.9 7 The two are just plain incompatible. All of which suggests that
190. L. TRiBE, supra note 6, at 1304.

191. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 205.
192. R. Hittinger, Privacy and Liberal Legal Culture 3 (unpublished manuscript available from the author).
193. Id.
194. Olsen, St. Augustine and the Problem of the Medieval Discovery of the Individual, 3 MONASTIc REvIEw 129, 132 (1987).
195. See Tierney, Panel Discussion, 5 J. OF L. & REL. 153 (1987).
196. Galatians2:20.
197. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 205.
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the "expressive self" has gone from the fringe of society to morally paradigmatic to determinative of constitutional law in little more than a generation. Make no mistake about it: This is the tidal wave that sweeps
away the traditional devotion to legal fostering of moral soundness. The
Constitution is decimated by its wake.
This revolution, like earthquakes, has aftershocks. The god of individual definition creates the rest of human reality. From this epicenter
rippling outwards is nothing less than the reconceptualization of morality,
personal relations, community, society, politics, and constitutional law.
Start with what I call the "inarguable orgasm." Sex is inevitable and its
object is satisfaction, psychological and physical. "Physical intimacy," it
seems from Blackmun's opinion19 and the logic of the new expressivism,
is a constitutional entitlement. Homosexuality is at least in part an irrestistible attraction, rooted in the "fiber of an individual's personality." 199 The eighth amendment may therefore "pose a constitutional
barrier to sending an individual to prison for acting on that attraction
regardless of the circumstances."2 '
The "moral" governance of sexual relations becomes a matter of consent and survival. Homosexual conduct used to be considered wrong. Now
Blackmun blesses it, because there is no evidence that sodomy is "physically dangerous, either to persons engaged in it or to others. '20 1 Other
"sexual crimes,' 20 2 Blackmun states, are not wrong either. We have already seen how the master principle redefines marriage into a mutually
beneficial expression of selves, ontologically indistinguishable from exploring the Grand Canyon in a canoe in the company of someone you like.
But not necessarily the company of one: Polygamy cannot be ruled out in
the new dispensation, and the Justices quizzed Tribe on precisely that
issue.20 3 Where is the harm to non-consenting participants? No-fault divorce and the new reproductive technology already have demonstrated
the "safety" of multiple parents. Ozzie and Harriet have been replaced by
Bob and Carol and Ted and Alice and ....
From these premises, adultery is no longer "wrong." Neither is incest. Indeed, Blackmun's pathetic attempt to pour the old wine-that
there is something troubling about them-into the new wineskins of
erotic selfhood proves it.2 0 4 The combined effect is to replace "sin" with
198. See id. 478 U.S. at 202-03 n.2.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 209.
202. Id. at 209 n.4.
203. See Transcript, supra note 25, at 22-23.

204. As Justice Blackmun states in Hardwick:
Although I do not think it necessary to decide today's issues that are not even
remotely before us, it does seem to me that a court could find simple, analytically sound distinctions between certain private, consensual sexual conduct, on
the one hand, and adultery and incest (the only two vaguely specific "sexual

crimes" to which the majority points, ante, at 196), on the other. For example,
marriage, in addition to its spiritual aspects, is a civil contract that entitles the
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two consumer advisories: caveat emptor, and wear your condom. By now
it is obvious that all interpersonal relations are problematic in a characteristic, new sense. All relations are essentially manipulative. The summum bonnum is individual mastery. But marriage and family life are
inevitably heteronomous; part of me becomes part of a "we." Is that not
the dread loss of autonomy? How, now, about religious community? Tribe
discusses religious community.
There is some "hope of solving the persistent problem of autonomy
and community," 20 5 which Tribe decisively joins to (equates with?) the
"dilemma of contemporary individuals-isolated and made vulnerable to
the state's distant majorities at the very moment they are liberated from
'20 6
domination by those closes [sic] to them.

[A] rebirth of religious community [is not] a realistic prospect for more
than a handful of moderns. However much power we delegate to church
hierarchies or congregations under doctrines precluding judicial interference in ecclesiastical disputes, it seems accordingly unlikely that the
social and cultural cohesion that family provided in our national mythology will be supplied by worship or sacrament. 07
If there is any answer, it is to be found in "facilitating the emergence of
relationships that meet the human need for closeness, trust and love in
ways that may jar some conventional sensibilities .... ,,1oOf course,
now that "family" and "religious community" are effectively irrelevant to
the modern individual's "dilemma," conventional sensibilities-rooted in
devotion to family and church-are our democratic Constitution's nemesis. They cannot be sanctioned or fostered over against an individual's
unconventional decision to seek "closeness, trust, and love." The paradigm of religious liberty is no longer the autonomy of a worshipping community-now recast as a bunch of people in the same place sharing the
same warm blanket from MEANING MILLS or aesthetic appreciation
for liturgy-but the solitary "conscience" freely choosing whatever spiricontracting parties to a variety of governmentally provided benefits. A State
might define the contractual commitment necessary to become eligible for these
benefits to include a commitment of fidelity and then punish individuals for
breaching that contract. Moreover, a State might conclude that adultery is likely
to "injure" third persons, in particular, spouses and children of persons who engage in extramarital affairs. With respect to incest, a court might well agree with
respondent that the nature of familial relationships renders true consent to incestuous activity sufficiently problematical that a blanket prohibition of such
activity is warranted. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 21-22. Notably, the Court makes no
effort to explain why it has chosen to group private, consensual homosexual activity with adultery and incest rather than with private, consensual heterosexual
activity by unmarried persons or, indeed, with oral or anal sex within marriage.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 209-10 n.4.
205. L. TRIBE, supra note 6, at 1418.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
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tual values he or she desires." 9
Marriage, family, and church may seem a bit sterile in the new world,
but they are still, as tradition held, relative havens in a heartless world.
At least those relations are chosen. We have a right to control over such
intimate access to us. But we cannot choose those who live in our society
(though by abortion we may discourage some of them from reproducing
themselves). "Society" is then a terrifying behemoth. Upon this fear
terms like "the state" and "majority" feed for rhetorical energy. Let me
explain, briefly, what society and political life are like in the new world,
and how they relate to the primordial reality of individual expression.
Venturing into society in the best case scenario is like going to a suburban mall. The worst case is like stepping onto a subway car in the wee
hours with no cop in sight. Gone in either event is the security borne of
control over relations in the private life of family and friends. We are now
among strangers whose "expression" cannot be predicted and who are essentially subject to no internal moral restraint. That is, we all live in a
world of "autonomy" and "domination." We can only hope that we encounter few persons who express themselves by dominating others. Sure,
we may have internalized the "harm" principle, but the "harm" principle
is intrinsically like the Nazi-Soviet pact. Everyone sees it as a statement
of present intention produced by prevailing strategic considerations. Everyone also sees that the "obligation" to continued adherence is a function of perceived self-interest. No one takes it as a solemn promise. Like
commercial contracts in this new order, we do not promise to do "X."
Rather we agree that, if ordered by a court, we will pay the value of "X"
in dollars if, at the time of performance, we find it advantageous to do
"Y" rather than "X."
People go to a mall seeking some item or service which will satisfy
the desire or need that prompted the trip. The "good" of being there,
despite the MUZAK and plastic smiles of sales people, is wholly internal
to us. Its denizens-the merchants-are there to satisfy their desire or
need for money at our expense. The exchange need not be unpleasant,
but no one doubts that the exchanges are rooted in perceived self-interest. We go to malls (instead of downtown) these days primarily because
there we encounter folks like us. (I, at least, am a thirty-six year old middle class male. I rarely wear "colors" or carry a copy of Easy Rider). We
are decent people.
The late night subway ride differs in only one respect: We might encounter folks with rough edges, "them." They are just like us, except
"they" are not yuppies. Our "great deal" or "bargain" is their "mugging."
After all, are not all relations in a field of power? Have we not convinced
ourselves that crime is a function of legitimate needs and desires (for example, needs for money or power) that are denied legitimate satisfaction.
If we are real liberals, we confess that "we" have constructed the "sys209. See Bradley, Dogmatomachy: A 'Privatization'Theory of the Religion Clause
Cases, 30 ST. Louis U.L.J. 275 (1986).
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tern" to our advantage. That is because the rules have no moral or ontological ground save facilitation of self-expression and gratification.
Justice Brennan produced the definitive view of "society" in Michael
H. v. Gerald D.:
[In] construing the Fourteenth Amendment to offer shelter only to
those interests specifically protected by historical practice, moreover,
the plurality ignores the kind of society in which our Constitution exists. We are not an assimilative, homogeneous society, but a facilitative,
pluralistic one, in which we must be willing to abide someone else's unfamiliar or even repellent practice because the same tolerant impulse
protects our own idiosyncrasies.21 0
In other words, we are a society of strangers. 21 1 Brennan says our society
is "facilitative." Hittinger remarks that this means "that social goods are
recognized only insofar as the [sic] serve the choices of individuals.1 212
Society has no intrinsic existence. "If we look at social realities as the
products of individual choices, then it is a short step of logic to assert
that society has anything other than a 'facilitative' value, since that is
presumably what individuals endowed it with in the first place." 213 One
might have hoped that "society" might be defined by some deeper bond
and commitment, by some shared moral substance or solidaristic spirit.
Tradition carried on such an enterprise, in part, by the "enforcement of
morals." That project is now barely understandable to Blackmun. He
translates it as simple "intolerance." But "tolerance," we can now say,
has some daunting costs.
The nature and purpose of politics are now set. Like society, politics
is a recurring necessary evil. Its source and nature are determined by our
philosophy of "human being." "Private" life, given what man "is" and
wants, is the specifically human life. Men determine for themselves what
ends they will pursue; their realization and enjoyment are intrinsically
private activities. As Barbara Lenk writes, politics is not constitutive of
happiness or an aspect of human existence. 214 "It is not 'natural' to man
in the sense that it is necessary to the fulfillment of his proper end, nor in
the sense that some men are made to rule by nature or commissioned by
divine appointment."' 15
A more fulfilling conception of politics is ruled out by liberalism at
the outset. Liberalism is largely defined as the negation of those alternatives. Politics cannot have as its end the promotion of human excellence
nor the service of God. Politics maintains enough order to keep the trains
running on time while we live our private lives with a maximum possible
degree of happiness and autonomy. Politics is the "precondition for the
maintenance of life-its betterment and its enjoyment-in the private
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2351 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Hittinger, supra note 192, at 5.
Id. at 25.
Id.
Lenk, supra note 179, at 177.
Id.
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Law and custom-the product of political and social life-are now
necessarily experienced as brute restraint, like the weather or the fact
that I will never be Michael Jordan. Such rules are wholly external to the
self and its good. They are inimical to the unrestricted expression of individuality which is the good of persons. Like the weather, one attends to
it, its prediction, and its. probable effect upon one's plans. But it means
nothing.
We can bring into final view just how constitutional law, its substance and its form, is determined by the construction of reality emanating from the "artistic" self. "Law" is the lasso of that posse of strangers,
the "majority." The only available way to grasp their motives is "intolerance." "They" find some need satisfied by forcing others to conform to
their own values. Anyway, all Blackmun can muster is a dyspeptic metaphor when staring at a law attempting to inculcate virtue. Evidently,
some individuals make choices that upset the majority. Instead of reaching for Alka-Seltzer to make the pain go away, they arrest somebody like
Mr. Hardwick.
"Tradition," then, does look like Holmes' vision of it. It is but another expression for "majority," this time with cobwebs. Both represent
"intolerance," which itself means nothing other than unwarranted, i.e.,
more than facilitative, law. "Facilitative" is a shorthand for liberal political morality. In all events, heteronomy is the bad guy. Any rule laid down
from without the individual violates the good of expressive self-hood. The
substance of constitutional law is apparent. I have chosen as my summation the critical argument of the new clerisy, 885 law professors, in the
Webster case:
The right of personal privacy stands against state domination over matters crucial to self-possession: self-definition in matters of value and
conscience, and self-determination regarding ways and walks of life. By
its force, government's hand is stayed from the diverse choices by
which persons define their values, form and maintain communities of
belief and practice, and bring up children whose lives in turn will be
their own and not the State's. Accordingly, the Court's privacy doctrine
has placed decisions regarding procreation, parenthood, and family formation at the core of those from which a non-totalitariangovernment
must ordinarily be excluded.
The right of personal privacy is the right of self-possession against
the State, and the self begins with the body. "[To say] that my body
can be used is [to say] that I can be used . . . ." Moreover, "the sense
of possession of oneself ... extends to possession of one's function.
217
And this extends quite naturally to reproduction.

To adapt George Bush's campaign theme, the ideal society would
consist of some 240 million points of regretfully flickering light, of so
many "cells" striving to master their identities, and to journey into the
216. Id.
217. Law professors' brief, supra note 75, at 6.
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nether-reaches of self-expression. Rightfully, they would serve as their
own generators. Conditions of interdependence prevent that. So these
flickers convey their "juice" to the constitutionalist. He then redistributes
it in like amounts to everyone. This is facilitative constitutional law; it
has need of but one doctrine variously known as "privacy," "autonomy,"
and conscience. Constitutional law is thus the legalitarian utility; the constitutionalist, the master electrician.

